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Abstract
As utility companies develop and incorporate new technologies, such as moving
to utility Internet technology based architecture and standard; it is crucial that we
do so with history in mind. We know that traditional utility protection and control
systems were not designed with security in their top priorities. This presents a danger
in an environment where near real-time responses are required to ensure safe operations. As a consequence, system security becomes a burden to the system rather than
necessary protection.
Unfortunately, technology implementation is not the only concern. The number of utility privately-owned companies has multiplied as the market has moved to
a deregulated market in an effort to fragment the traditional monopolies that ruled
the industry. Additionally, as new technologies replace or are coupled with legacy
systems; new risks to our national assets are incorporated. We have to keep in mind
recent events that have proven that our nation is vulnerable to attacks that could
severely hinder our economy. Unfortunately, this is easier said than done. The conditions under which these systems operate make it almost impossible to make updates,
replace components, or whole systems, without endangering normal operations due
to malfunctions, installation and calibration errors, or immature technology.
This research proposes an alternate method to do this technology merger safely.
This method uses new concepts, such as the trust system and power grid compartmentalization to dramatically increase protection of the network. The great benefit of
this method is that it can be implemented gradually. During this thesis, we will transform a SCADA network compartmentalization problem and a trust system strategic
placement problem into an optimization problem, by methodically designing a mathematical model and later applying linear programming algorithms and techniques to
solve it.
iv

Acknowledgements
I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my thesis advisor, Dr. Kenneth
Hopkinson, for his patience, guidance, recommendations, and assistance throughout
the course of this thesis effort. Likewise, I would like to thank my committee members,
Lt Col Stuart J. Kurkowski, Major Ryan W. Thomas for all their help and advice in
putting this thesis together. I am also very thankful to student interns James Haught
for providing his expertise in writing the optimizer code and Alex Stirling for helping
in many different ways during this research.

Juan M. Carlos Gonzalez

v

Dedication
I would like to dedicate this work to my children and family for their support and
words of encouragement. I also would like to dedicate this research effort to the memory of an aunt who always reminded me of the importance of family during difficult
times and that doing what you believe in is right for others is just as important;
even when in doing so may reflect poorly on yourself. However, doing this; gives you
the peace of mind of knowing you did everything within your power to help. This
satisfaction at the end allowed me to be more productive professionally. I miss your
early morning calls... Thanks, “Tia”

Juan M. Carlos Gonzalez

vi

Table of Contents
Page
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iv

Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

v

Dedication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

vi

List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

x

List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xiii

List of Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xv

I.

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 Problem Statement . . . . . . . . .
1.3 Research Objective and Hypothesis
1.4 Why is this research important? . .
1.5 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.6 Preview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

1
1
2
5
5
6
6

II.

Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1 Chapter Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2 Critical Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3 Electrical Power System or Power Grid . . . . . .
2.3.1 Power Outages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.2 Power Outage Effects . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.3 History of Power Outages . . . . . . . . .
2.4 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems
2.5 Brief History of SCADA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.6 Time Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.7 SCADA System Components . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.7.1 SCADA Data Flow Summary . . . . . . .
2.7.2 A note on Intelligent Electronic Devices .
2.8 SCADA applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.9 System Reliability Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.10 The Threat to Utility Operations . . . . . . . . . .
2.11 SCADA system security issues . . . . . . . . . . .
2.12 Utility Industry Intranet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

7
7
7
12
15
16
16
25
28
29
30
33
34
34
38
39
40
41

vii

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

Page
2.13 What is next in SCADA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.14 SCADA Security Evolves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.15 The Trust System Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.15.1 How the Trust System works. . . . . . . . . . .
2.15.2 Inter-Company and Inter-Area Protection. . . .
2.15.3 Internal Traffic Protection . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.16 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.16.1 Combining Quality of Service and Topology Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.16.2 Dialable Cryptography for Wireless Networks .
2.16.3 Network Design Problem Formulation . . . . . .
2.17 Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III.

IV.

Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1 What is the problem? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 Problem description and Research Objective . . . .
3.3 IEEE Test Case Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4 Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4.1 Data Preprocessing . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4.2 Mathematical Programming or Optimization
3.4.3 Linear Programming . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4.4 Mathematical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4.5 Application used for model development . .
3.4.6 Input of Model in Optimizer and Validation
3.5 Response Times or Thresholds . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Analysis and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.1 XPress-MP Platforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.2 Results analyzed, and questions answered . . .
4.3 Input File . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4 Result evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.1 Output file . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.2 Measurements, Units and Calculations
4.4.3 Figure interpretation . . . . . . . . . .
4.5 Observation variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.6 Model Variables Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.6.1 Minimum number of buses per domain
4.6.2 Maximum number of trust nodes . . .
4.6.3 Variable effect analysis . . . . . . . . .
viii

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

43
43
44
45
45
46
46
46
46
47
47

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

49
49
50
52
56
56
59
61
62
69
70
71
72

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

73
73
73
74
75
75
75
75
76
76
77
78
78

Page
4.7

4.8
4.9
4.10
4.11
4.12
4.13

Scenario Runs . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.7.1 Fourteen Node Scenario . . . .
4.7.2 Twenty Node Scenario . . .
4.7.3 Thirty Node Scenario . . .
57 Node Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Note on Windows runs . . . . . . . . . .
Totals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reduced Response Times or Thresholds
Windows VS Linux . . . . . . . . . . . .
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

79
80
95
103
106
106
107
107
109
110

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

V.

Conclusions and Recommendations . . . .
5.1 Chapter Overview . . . . . . . .
5.2 Research Overview . . . . . . . .
5.3 Summary of Research Findings .
5.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.5 Significance of Research . . . . .
5.6 Recommendations for future work

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

111
111
111
111
113
113
114

VI.

Appendix 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

116

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

118

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

Author Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

ix

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

List of Figures
Figure

Page

1.1.

Initial Stages Region of Blackout of 2003 [25] . . . . . . . . . .

3

2.1.

Examples of Critical Infrastructures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

2.2.

North America power grid major interconnections [25] . . . . .

13

2.3.

Basic Components of the electric power grid infrastructure [32]

14

2.4.

Blackout of 1965 in North America [35] . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17

2.5.

Path followed by the Storm on 1989. [33] . . . . . . . . . . . .

18

2.6.

Solar Storm and Earth’s magnetic Field [34] . . . . . . . . . . .

19

2.7.

Region affected by blackout of 2003 [2] . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

20

2.8.

NERC Regions and main connections [25] . . . . . . . . . . . .

22

2.9.

Timeline of events during the initial phase of Blackout. [25] . .

25

2.10.

SCADA master control station [6] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

2.11.

Diagram showing how electricity is produced in a Nuclear Plant
[23] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

2.12.

Images of the Chernobyl Accident [12] . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

36

2.13.

Texas City, Texas after the refinery explosion of 1947 [22] . . .

38

3.1.

Current network topology used as input for this research . . . .

50

3.2.

Network topology produced showing domains and trust node
placement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

51

3.3.

Diagram of network represented by the 14 bus test case [31] . .

52

3.4.

Diagram of network represented by the 30 bus test case [31] . .

53

3.5.

Diagram representing the 57 bus test case [31] . . . . . . . . .

53

3.6.

Diagram Representing the 118 Bus Test Case [31] . . . . . . . .

54

3.7.

Diagram representing the 300 bus test case [31] . . . . . . . . .

55

4.1.

Configuration changes using different input values on the same
scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

x

77

Figure
4.2.

Page
Configuration for a 14 Node network, 2 trust nodes, 5 minimum
nodes per domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4.3.

Configuration for a 14 Node network, 7 trust nodes, 2 minimum
nodes per domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4.4.

4.7.
4.8.
4.9.
4.10.

nodes per domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

86

Configuration for a 14 Node network, 4 trust nodes, 2 minimum
nodes per domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

87

14 Node network, Maximum of 10 trust nodes, and a minimum
of 2 nodes per domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

89

14 Node network, Maximum of 5 trust nodes, and a minimum of
2 nodes per domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

90

Configuration for a 14 Node network, 6 trust nodes, 2 minimum

4.16.
4.17.

98

20 Node network, maximum of 10 trust nodes, and a minimum
of 2 nodes per domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4.15.

96

20 Node network, Maximum of 10 trust nodes, and a minimum
of 4 nodes per domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4.14.

94

20 Node network, Maximum of 14 trust nodes, and a minimum
of 2 nodes per domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4.13.

92

Configuration changes using different input values on the same
scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4.12.

85

Configuration for a 14 Node network, 7 trust nodes, 4 minimum

nodes per domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.11.

84

Configuration for a 14 Node network, 7 trust nodes, 2 minimum
nodes per domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4.6.

82

Configuration for a 14 Node network, 2 trust nodes, 2 minimum
nodes per domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4.5.

81

101

20 Node network, maximum of 10 trust nodes, and a minimum
of 4 nodes per domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

102

30 Node network, Maximum of 10 trust nodes, and a minimum
of 6 nodes per domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

105

Configurations results using 2 different response time values . .

108

xi

Figure

Page

4.18.

Fourteen Node scenario results from Windows and Linux

. . .

109

A.1.

30 Node network, Maximum of 10 trust nodes, and a minimum
of 6 nodes per domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

117

xii

List of Tables
Table

Page

1.1.

Sources and Motivations for Utility Disruptions and Attack [9]

2.1.

Critical Infrastructures and Lead Agencies as layed out in PPD63 [20]

4

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10

2.2.

Evolution of the Critical Infrastructure List [20] . . . . . . . . .

12

2.3.

Typical SCADA Time operating constraints [5] . . . . . . . . .

30

3.1.

Time Constraint in milliseconds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

72

4.1.

Running times for network with 14 Nodes, and 5 messages in
Windows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

79

4.2.

Number of runs per scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

80

4.3.

Running times for Network with 14 Nodes, and 3 messages in
Linux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

80

4.4.

Message paths for the 14 node, 3 message fastest case in Linux

81

4.5.

Message paths for the 14 node, 3 message slowest case in Linux

83

4.6.

Running times for Network with 14 Nodes, and 3 messages in
Windows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

83

4.7.

Message paths traversed for the 14 Node 3 message fastest case
in Windows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

84

Message paths traversed for the 14 Node 3 message slowest case
in Windows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

85

4.9.

Running times for 14 node network with and 5 messages in Linux

86

4.10.

Message paths and delays for the 14 Node, 5 message fastest case

4.8.

in Linux

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

87

Message paths traversed for the 14 Node, 5 message fastest case
in Linux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

88

4.12.

Running times for scenario with 14 Nodes, 5 messages in Windows

89

4.13.

Message paths traversed for the 14 Node, 5 message fastest case

4.11.

in Windows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
xiii

90

Table
4.14.

Page
Message paths traversed for the 14 Node 5 message case in Windows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

91

Running times for Network with 14 Nodes, and 5 messages in
Linux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

91

4.16.

Message paths traversed for the 14 Node, 10 message case in Linux

93

4.17.

Running times for Network with 14 Nodes, and 10 messages in
Windows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93

Message paths traversed for the 14 Node, 10 message case in
Windows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

95

Running times for Network with 20 Nodes, and 10 messages in
Linux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

96

4.20.

Message paths traversed for the 20 Node, 10 message case in Linux

97

4.21.

Running times for Network with 20 Nodes, and 10 messages in
Windows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

97

Message paths traversed for the 20 Node, 10 message case in
Windows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

99

4.23.

Running times for a 20 Node Network and 20 messages in Linux

99

4.24.

Message paths traversed for the 20 Node, 20 message case in Linux

100

4.25.

Running times for Network with 20 Nodes, and 20 messages in
Windows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

102

Message paths traversed for the 20 Node, 20 message case in
Windows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

103

Running times for 30 Node network with 14 Nodes, and 10 messages in Linux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

104

Message paths traversed for the 30 Node, 10 message case in
Windows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

105

4.29.

Total Results for the over all runs shown in this document . . .

107

4.30.

Message paths traversed for the 14 Node 3 message slowest case
in Windows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

108

Message paths traversed for the 14 Node 3 message slowest case
in Windows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

109

4.15.

4.18.
4.19.

4.22.

4.26.
4.27.
4.28.

4.31.

xiv

List of Abbreviations
Abbreviation

Page

SCADA

Supervisory, Control and Data Acquisition System . . . .

2

E.O.

Executive Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

PCCIP

Critical Infrastructure Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

CI

Critical Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

PDD

Presidential Decision Directive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

DC

direct current . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13

GIC

Geomagnetically Induced Current . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18

FE

First Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

AEP

American Electric Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

MISO

Mid-West Independent System Operator . . . . . . . . . .

21

NERC

North American Electric Reliability Council . . . . . . . .

21

PJM

PJM interconnection LLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

RTO

Regional Transmission Organization . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

ECAR

East Central Area Reliability Coordination Agreement . .

21

MISO

Mid-West Independent System Operator . . . . . . . . . .

23

MW

MegaWatt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

24

SCADA

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition . . . . . . . . .

25

COTS

Commercial off-the shelf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

PLC

Programmable Logic Controllers . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29

WAPaC

Wide Area Protection and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29

MTU

Master Terminal Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

PC

Personal Computer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

HMI

Human Machine Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

PLC

Programmable Logic Controller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

32

I/O

Input/Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

32

xv

Abbreviation

Page

RTU

Remote Terminal Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

32

IED

Intelligent Electronic Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

32

LAN

Local Area Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

33

IT

Information Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

41

IT

Information Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

44

UW

University of Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

52

m

meter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

57

MILP

Mixed integer linear problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

60

QP

Quadratic problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

60

MIQP

Mixed integer quadratic problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

60

QCQP

Quadratically constrained quadratic problems . . . . . . .

60

CNLP

Convex non-linear problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

60

LP

Linear Programming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

61

tN

Trust Node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

62

CT

Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

67

msec

milliseconds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

75

secs

Seconds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

75

xvi

An Efficient and Effective Implementation
of the
Trust System
for Power Grid Compartmentalization
I. Introduction
1.1

Background
One of humanity’s greatest mistakes is not to learn from history. It is our duty

as a country to take events from the past and used them to better prepare ourselves
so that they are not repeated. This is an important principle in general, furthermore
it is vital when dealing with our country’s critical infrastructure protection. History
has shown that we, as a nation, are vulnerable to attacks on our resources and the
elements that control them.
The research introduced in this paper affects a sector of our nation that is
vital, the critical infrastructure sector. This sector is composed of industries that
make our lifestyle, as we know it, possible. Major components include the energy
industry, such as electricity, gas, petroleum, in its different phases of the life cycle,
water management and transportation management. The list of industries that have
been considered a part of nation’s critical infrastructure has evolved over the years.
Most of the industries included in the critical infrastructure list have one thing
in common; they all require near real-time monitoring. When a malfunction is detected, decisions need to be made immediately in order to prevent major incidents
and catastrophes from occurring. An instance of this unique operational characteristic
can be found in the electric power industry.
The electric power industry has become so important for our society that it has
become the focus of large efforts to prevent power system collapse and electric service
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stoppages. However, history has shown that these incidents are not part of a science
fiction movie. They are a reality; and when they occur, they have extremely costly
consequences. Unfortunately, the demand on the power system increases over time
and this increase puts the system at a greater risk of instabilities and collapses. As this
thesis will show, there have been instances where minuscule failures have escalated out
to larger regions and become major catastrophes. These events unfortunately have
not only occurred throughout the world but in our own country as well. These recent
collapses have revealed the urgent need to stabilize power systems by incorporating
better technologies that enhance not only the local protection at the field level, but
also at a system-wide protection level [18].
At the heart of the electric industry and many other critical utility industries,
lies a system that is essential to its performance, the Supervisory, Control and Data
Acquisition System (SCADA). This system manages these complex networks, often
with thousands of nodes monitored. They are capable of reliable and accurate near
real-time reactions (sometimes within thousandths of a second) to normal and abnormal variations, and emergency situations as well. Additionally, response time is not
the only concern. Accuracy and reliability are key concerns, as well.
The research reported in this thesis is relevant to these two separate but strongly
tied systems, critical infrastructures, specifically the electrical utility grid, and the
SCADA system.
1.2

Problem Statement
This research will create a method and tool to safely compartmentalized a util-

ity networks, namely SCADA, into regions. The communication within and between
regions will be protected by trust nodes, which will provide firewall, and intrusion detection capabilities, without disrupting time-sensitive protection and control
systems.
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The importance of compartmentalization is clearly emphasized by incidents
where a proper network topology could have been the difference between a local malfunction and an international blackout. The “Northeast Blackout of August 2003 ” is
the benchmark of the possible consequences of a malfunction within a single utility
service such as electricity. Even though the initial stages occurred in a small area in
Ohio, at the end the blackout affected 10 million people in the Canadian province of
Ontario and 40 million people in eight U.S. states. We will see in chapter 2 that the
sequence of malfunctions; if they had appropriately isolated the failures in the initial
stage the cascading effect could have been stopped at its roots before it became an
international incident. Figure 1.1 shows the region where the first malfunctions appeared during the Northeast Blackout of August 2003. Perhaps if a different network
topology or compartmentalization had been in place, the instability could have been
isolated to avoid its propagation to a larger area.

Figure 1.1:

Initial Stages Region of Blackout of 2003 [25]

In addition to this, SCADA systems have traditionally been manufactured using
proprietary systems and protocols without any regard for interoperability or industry
wide standards. However, in recent years the utility community has drifted away
from this architecture toward a more open network, communication standards, and
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Table 1.1: Sources
Source
Industrial Sabotage
or theft
Concentrated physical
and cyber attack
Vendor compromise
Technical design error
or environmental
influence
Natural disasters
Operator error

and Motivations for Utility Disruptions and Attack [9]
Reason
Financial Advantage in insider trading or competing
vendor partnerships
Destruction, terror, or activism
Easier to target supplier than the defended infrastructure
itself
Hardware or code; network design, installation and
configuration; or interferences from other technologies in
the environment
Earthquakes, tornadoes, volcanoes, fire, thunderstorms
Misjudgment, misconfiguration, or failure to remember
operational details resulting in dangerous and costly results

commercial-off-the-shelf components. This has made the industry vulnerable to new
threats, such as hacker attacks, other malicious code, and even what is known as
cyber-terrorism.
The system is vulnerable not only to traditional equipment malfunctions or
operator mistakes. Now, it is also subject to industry deregulation risks and external attacks such as denial of service attacks. Unfortunately, the systems are often
configured with little regard for security, and with these new threats security has become a new stronger concern and not just a network burden that increases response
times. Table 1.1 summarizes very briefly some of the attacks that the utility industry
networks are vulnerable to.
The exposure of SCADA systems to cyber attacks, incidents such as the blackout
of 2003 and its cascading effects, and the multiplication of independent companies
present in the utility industry, are sufficient reasons to investigate ways to protect
our nation’s vital functions. As stated in the opening paragraph of this chapter, the
approach taken in this research is to investigate the compartmentalization of a SCADA
network in an electric utility network. Additionally, we will use the suggestion made
by Coates, et al, of a trust system that performs important security tasks without
exceeding the important time constraints.
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1.3

Research Objective and Hypothesis
The purpose of this thesis is to implement and evaluate the suggestions ex-

pressed in the thesis document “Collaborative, Trust-Based Security Mechanisms for
a National Utility Intranet” [5], published by Major Gregory M. Coates, United States
Air Force. He suggests the implementation of a trust system throughout the power
grid and inside a SCADA facility. This thesis will also utilize some of the results
from the work “Evaluating Security and Quality of Service Considerations in Critical Infrastructure Communication Networks” [28] by Captain Gregory R. Roberts,
United States Air Force. He tested the use of several communication protocols at
varying background traffic loads. The results incorporated into this research are the
refinement of response time thresholds and time constraints.
In addition to combining these two results, the author proposes the compartmentalization (or sub-grouping) of the network (or grid) to provide isolation that may
be helpful when a failure is detected and, in that way, minimize or avoid a cascading
failure. During the research, trust nodes will be added to strategic locations in
the networks such that the communication between groups is always monitored and
secured. The system will evaluate the propagation delay and also the delay resulting
from the installation of the trust node to ensure that no constraint is violated.
It is the hypothesis of this author that the compartmentalized network topologies, and the placement of trust nodes is possible without violating the strict network
time constraints necessary for safe operations.
1.4

Why is this research important?
This research is critical, because the systems that SCADA systems monitor

cannot be stopped or halted in order to implement security upgrades or install new
equipment. The nature of their environment dictates that the system always be
operational. This makes their upgrade or replacement very difficult and expensive.
The solution evaluated allows for a new security mechanism to be fielded incrementally

5

without major interruptions of service while increasing the protection the this systems
deserve.
1.5

Assumptions
It is assumed that future utility intranet used in power grid and SCADA net-

works will mimic the network architecture commonly implemented in the corporate
world. Some of the delays such as propagation delays, transmission delays, encryption
delays are assumed to be accurate for this study based on literature available.
In order to make this research possible several assumptions are considered for
the study. I assume the fiber cable is used as the communication means in the grid.
This assumption is important in order to calculate the distance between nodes in the
grid.
1.6

Preview
The layout of this document is as follows:

• Chapter 2 will provide the basic understanding on the four topic affected by this
research, starting from a broader perspective of critical infrastructure, then
we focus on the Electric power industry, SCADA network fundamentals,
and finally on the concept of a trust system.
• Chapter 3 will list the tools utilized during the research and will also describe
the methodology and approach taken to solve the problem on network compartmentalization and trust system implementation utilizing Linear Programming
techniques.
• Chapter 4 will present and interpret the results gathered from the experimentation.
• Chapter 5 presents and explains the conclusions derived from the results obtained during the experimentation and make recommendations for future work.
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II. Literature Review
2.1

Chapter Overview

C

hapter two has as goals to review the information necessary to understand the
concepts examined in this research. It provides the necessary background and

complementary material that enables the reader to set the basic foundation , and picture the environment where the results of this research could be utilized. This chapter
presents this background information using a top to bottom approach, beginning with
critical infrastructure protection, narrowing down to power grid, Supervisory, Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems and finally narrowing down to the specific
focus of this research, the description of the trust system in SCADA networks.
2.2

Critical Infrastructure
Infrastructure is defined in the American Heritage Dictionary as “the facilities,

or services for a community to function appropriately” [20]. These can be the communication system, utility facilities like water and electric power lines, and public
institutions to include schools, post offices, and even prisons. Fig.2.1 shows instances
of activities that are considered part of our critical infrastructure. In the arena of
U.S. public policy, the term has evolved throughout the years, and many times was
considered to be ambiguous. In a report issued 20 years ago by the Council of State
Planning Agencies, the term was defined as,“a wide array of public facilities and equipment required to provide social services and support to economic activities”. In this
report, the facilities included roads, bridges, water and sewer systems, airports, ports,
and public buildings, and could also include schools, health facilities, jails, recreations
facilities, electric power productions, fire safety, waste disposal, and communications
services.
In 1984, Congress defined infrastructure as facilities with high fixed costs, long
economic lives, strong links to economic development, and a tradition of public sector
involvement [20]. Hazardous waste services were also added to the list. The con-

7

(a) Nuclear Plant [25]

(b) Oil Refinery [13]

(c) Electric Grid [14]

Figure 2.1:

(d) Electric Power Generation [14]

Examples of Critical Infrastructures

cern was mainly in the adequacy of the infrastructure to satisfy our country’s needs.
Facilities were many time considered to be obsolete and of insufficient capacity.
Finally, the mid-1990s renewed federal government interest in infrastructure issues due, mainly, to the growing threat of international terrorism. The focus changed
from infrastructure adequacy to infrastructure protection. In 1996, President Clinton signed Executive Order (E.O.) 13010 establishing the President’s Commission on
Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) [20]. It was here that the term Critical
Infrastructure (CI) was applied for the first time. And it was then that the list of facilities was narrowed down to a few industries which excluded public housing, private
rail service, schools, and other facilities. E.O. 13010 ended the ambiguity of the term
by listing what it considered to be critical infrastructure. According to this executive
order, these critical infrastructure were:
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• Telecommunications
• Electrical power
• Gas and oil storage and transportation;
• Banking and finance
• Transportation
• Water supply systems
• Emergency services ( including medical, fire, police, and rescue) and
• Continuity of government
This list of activities included in the PCCIP final report included facilities owned
by private companies and others actually come from other countries such as gas lines
that come from Mexico or the electricity distribution lines that come from Canada
[15]. This is why our government and more specifically the Department of Homeland
Security Science and Technology Directorate conduct research in many areas including
cyber security.
As a response to the report, President Clinton signed the Presidential Decision
Directive (PDD) 63 [20]. The goal of this directive was to be able to protect our
critical infrastructure from intentional disruption. PDD-63 directed specific federal
agencies to lead this security efforts which are shown in Table 2.1. It is noteworthy
to mention the addition of “cyber-structure”to the list.
As a result, a national plan for critical infrastructure was created [20]. This plan
defines critical infrastructure as “those systems and assets (both physical and cyber)
so vital to the Nation that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating
impact on national security, national economic security, and/or national public health
and safety”.
The attacks of September 11, 2001 gave ground to the drafting of E.O. 13228
signed by President Bush and the USA PATRIOT and Homeland Security Acts [20].
E.O. 13228 established the office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security
9

Table 2.1: Critical Infrastructures
Lead Agency
Dept. of Commerce
Dept. of Treasury
Environmental Protection Agency
Dept. Of Transportation
Dept. of Justice and or FBI
Federal Emergency
Management Agency
Federal Emergency
Management. Agency
Dept. of Energy

and Lead Agencies as layed out in PPD-63 [20]
Critical Infrastructure
Information and communications
Banking and finance
Water Supply
Aviation, Highways, Mass Transit,
Pipelines, Rail, Waterborne Commerce
Emergency law enforcement services
Emergency Fire Service
Continuity of government services
Public health services, including prevention,
surveillance, laboratory services, and personal
health services
Electric power, Oil and gas production and
storage

Council. The office is the lead in coordinating efforts to protect our critical infrastructure throughout the different government agencies. This Executive Order provides a
list of facilities which include previous facilities but it also adds to the list nuclear
sites, special events and agriculture to the list which had not been part of the list
before. The USA Patriot and Homeland Security Acts are important because they
created the National Strategy for Homeland Security.
According to the new National Strategy there are 11 sectors and 5 key assets to
the economy which are considered part of our National Critical Infrastructure, which
encompass the following sectors [20]:
• Agriculture and food
• Water
• Public Health
• Emergency services
• Defense industrial base
• Telecommunications
• Energy
10

• Transportation
• Banking and finance
• Chemicals and hazardous materials
• Postal and shipping
The key assets are the following:
1. National Monuments and icons
2. Nuclear Power Plants
3. Dams
4. Government facilities (offices and governmental departments)
5. Commercial key assets (i.e. major skyscrapers)
As we can see, the identification of our critical infrastructures is not an easy
task. The term itself has been subject to continuous modifications, economics sectors
have been added to the list, while others have been removed. Table 2.2 illustrates
how the list has evolved throughout the different directives, executive orders, and
other documents that modified due to needs mandated by external situations, such
as terrorist attacks and new technologies. The responsibility of identifying these
assets has been shared between the private sector and the federal agencies. PDD-63
obligated each federal agency to coordinate efforts with entities in the private sector
to assess their very own vulnerabilities to physical and cyber attacks.
Critical Infrastructure is a subject that concerns not only the sectors involved,
but almost any other sector of our nation’s economic machine. To emphasize its
importance, the following lines were added to the official definition, “An infrastructure
so vital that its incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on our
defense and national security ” [17].
Critical Infrastructure represents the bird’s eye view of the topics covered in
this research. The Power Grid is the specific system where this research applies.
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Table 2.2:
Infrastructure

Transportation
Water Supply/Waste

Evolution of the Critical Infrastructure List [20]
U.S. Government Reports and Executive Orders
CBO

NCPWI

E.O.13010

PDD-63

E.O.13228

NSHS

NSPP

HSPD-7

(1983)

(1988)

(1996)

(1998)

(2001)

(2002)

(2003)

(2003)

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

Water Treatment
Education
Public Health
Prisons
Industrial Capacity
Waste Services
Telecommunications
Energy
Banking and Finance
Emergency Services
Government Continuity

X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X

Information Systems

X
X
X
X
X
X

Nuclear Facilities
Special Events
Agriculture/Food supply
Defense Industrial Base
Chemical Industry
Postal/Shipping services
Monuments and icons
Key Industries/Tech Sites
Large Gathering Sites

2.3

X
X

X
X
X
X

Electrical Power System or Power Grid
The electrical transmission system (or Power Grid) developed in North America

is one of the greatest engineering achievements of the past 100 years [25]. It connects
200,000 miles of transmission lines which operate at a minimum of 230,000 volts.
It has a generating capacity of 950,000 megawatts and it serves over 100 million
customer. The infrastructure itself represents an asset worth one trillion dollars.
Originally, power systems were created as self-sufficient units. Power consumption was easily satisfied by the production. In a case of a severe failure, a system
collapse was unavoidable and meant a total blackout and interruption of the supply
12

for all customers. Since the system was small, synchronization of the generators and
restoration of the service was easily done [38].
Even though the power system in North America is commonly referred to as
“power grid”, it is actually divided into three distinct grids or“interconnections”. Fig.
2.2 show the interconnections mentioned above. The interconnections are isolated
from each other with the exception of small direct current (DC) ties.

Figure 2.2:

North America power grid major interconnections [25]

The reliability of the power grid is crucial to our economy, since our society
has come to depend on the electricity it produces for an immense number of activities. Electricity is an essential resource for health, education, transportation, and
welfare, as well as national security. Additionally, it powers our heating, cooling, and
lighting, computers and electronics, communications, transportations, etc. We have
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come to assume the availability of electricity in our daily life and as we integrate new
technologies into our daily life we produce more demand for this service. However,
we seldom experience blackouts and when we do, they are caused by minor incidents
such as a car hitting a power pole, a cable damaged by a lightning storm, or a crew
member that affects small areas. But we rarely experience a massive outage covering
thousands of square miles and for a period of time larger than a few minutes.
However, reliable electricity presents a complex technical challenge because of
the convolutedness of the system of the system that monitors its proper functioning
even at normal days and also because of the time constraints that it operates under.
Fig. 2.3 shows the process followed from generation to consumption. At generation stations, electricity is produced at voltages of 10, 000 to 25, 000 volts, regardless of
the nature of the generation stations ( nuclear, oil, hydro power, geothermal, etc) [32].
Next, it is stepped up to voltages varying from 230, 000 to 765, 000 volts in order to
reduce cost and losses when transmitted through large distances. Switching stations
and substations provide interconnection between transmission lines. This is named
“power grid” because they form a network of lines and stations. Finally, when the
energy arrives to the load center it is“stepped down”to lower voltages for distribution
to consumers; for industrial and commercial consumers it is normally reduced between
12, 000 to 115, 000 volts and 120 and 240 volts for residential users. All these steps
happen almost instantly because the electricity used the moment is generated.

Figure 2.3:

Basic Components of the electric power grid infrastructure [32]
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As the population grew, consumption grew as well; the demand for power has
grown at an accelerated pace beyond that of production. This continuous growth in
generation and demand has inherently provoked an increase in the complexity and
size of the power system. Unfortunately, these are not the only consequences of this
growth. There is also an increased risk of instabilities such as:
• Frequency Instability. This situation is caused by the incapability of the
system to maintain safe frequency thresholds (i.e. 60Hz).
• Voltage Instability. When this situation exists the system is not able to
support voltage requirements under normal operations or to recover from disturbances [32].
• Transient Angular Instability or Generator’s Out-of-step Situation.
This condition is present when the system is incapable of sustaining phase synchronization among the generators generally after severe disturbances [32].
• Local mode of Small-Signal Angular Instability Similar to the situation
described above, however it is present at one station or in a small part of the
power grid. Also, it is present under small disturbances which occur continually
under small variations in loads and generation [32].
Many times, the system is not able to recover from these conditions, and power
outages are sometimes present in small areas and then cascade out to larger regions
since the imbalance and instability between demand and generation rises after blackouts occur.
2.3.1

Power Outages.

Power outages are also known as power failures, or

blackouts. There are several types of power outages, categorized mainly by their
duration and the effect of the power loss:
• Dropout. This is the shortest of the power losses. Power is restored quickly
once the fault is detected, and often the system automatically fixes the fault [32].
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• Brownout. The name comes from its light dimming effect. This is produced by
a drop of voltage. This type of malfunction is particularly damaging to electric
motors [32].
• Blackout. This is the most severe malfunction, which refer to the total loss of
power to an area. Power Outages can last hours and sometimes days, depending
on the configurations of the Electrical Grid or the cause of the malfunction [32].
2.3.2

Power Outage Effects.

Our society has become completely dependent

on Electrical Power, there is no place or activity that does not utilize this source
of energy. As a consequence, power failures are particularly critical at sites where
the environment and public safety are at risk; such as hospitals, sewerage treatment
plants, mines etc [20].
2.3.3

History of Power Outages.

Unfortunately, power outages are not rare

incidents in modern history. In the last 40 years, there has been a minimum of 20
major blackouts, these include only the wide-scale power outages. The following is a
short list of some of the power outages that have occurred since 1965.
2.3.3.1

Northeast Blackout of 1965.

This power outage affected

Ontario, in Canada and Connecticut, Mass., New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont,
New York, and New Jersey in the United States [35]. The blackout left close to 25
million people and 80, 000 square miles for almost 12 hours. Fig. 2.4 shows the region
affected by this incident.
The reason for its failure is attributed to human error [35]. A protective relay
on one of the transmission lines was set to a much lower value instead of set to trip
and protect the line if the flow of power exceeded the line’s capacity. Its origin was
located in the Niagara generating station in Southern Ontario.
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Figure 2.4:

2.3.3.2

Blackout of 1965 in North America [35]

Great Storm of 1987.

On October 15/16 of that year, the

most famous weather event of the 20th century in Europe occurred [33]. This storm
had gusts between 70 and 100 knots. This became south western England’s worst
storm since the Great Storm of 1703. It is estimated it killed 18 people in England, 4
people in France and it is estimated that 15 million trees were lost in England alone.
The storm left many about 150, 000 households without telephone communications
and many hundreds of thousands without power, causing a total of 2.3 million of
power disconnection days. Connection days is a measure used by the electricity industry to assess the combination of the number of disconnected properties with the
length of the interruption. Fig. 2.5 shows the path that the storm followed.
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Figure 2.5:

2.3.3.3

Path followed by the Storm on 1989. [33]

Geomagnetic Storm of 1989.

A geomagnetic storm is a

temporary disturbance of the Earth’s magnetosphere which can be caused by changes
in the space weather, related most of the time to solar flares and other solar phenomena, which produce a solar wind shock [34] . When the shock travels toward the earth
it brings with it pressure changes that disturb the electric field of the earth. The
duration of a magnetic storm is normally 24 to 48 hours, however there have been
cases where the storm has lasted many days. Fig. 2.6 shows how the sun causes a
geomagnetic storm.
Disturbances caused by solar activity can disrupt power grids. When the Earth’s
magnetic field captures ionized particles carried by the solar wind, geomagnetically
induced current (GIC) can flow through the power system, entering and exiting the
18

many grounding points on a transmission network [34]. GICs are produced when
shocks resulting from sudden and severe magnetic storms capture portions of the
Earth’s surface to fluctuations in the planet’s normally stable magnetic field. These
variations create potential voltage differences between grounding points, and these
cause GICs to flow through electrical transformers, power lines, and grounding points.
Unfortunately, only a few amps are needed to disrupt transformer operations. However, over 100 amps have been measured in the grounding connections of transformers
in affected areas. It is important to note that many portions of the power grid in
North America are vulnerable to geomagnetic storms. Much of the grid is located in
northern latitudes, near the north magnetic pole.

Figure 2.6:

Solar Storm and Earth’s magnetic Field [34]

The Hydro Quebec outage resulted from the linked malfunction of more than 15
discrete protective-system operations [34]. From the initial event to complete blackout, only one-and-a half minutes elapsed. Fortunately, the outage happened during
low demand conditions and was contained within the province’s borders. Otherwise,
it could have spread across the northeastern United States, extending to Washington,
D.C. area.
19

2.3.3.4

Northeast Blackout of 2003.

On August 14, 2003, large

portions of the Midwest and Northeast United States, and Ontario, Canada, experienced an electric power blackout [25]. The outage affected an area with an estimated
50 million people. Power was not restored for 4 days in some parts of the United
States. Parts of Ontario suffered intermittent blackouts for more than a week before
full power was restored. The estimated loss in the United States range between $4
billion and $10 billion dollars. Fig. 2.7 shows the region that was left without power.

b
Figure 2.7:

Region affected by blackout of 2003 [2]

The blackout itself was the consequence of a sequence of events and system
weaknesses that maybe by themselves could not have lead blackout of such proportions
and could have existed undetected for a large period of time. However, the right
conditions existed so that the chain of malfunctions on that day and escalated up to
the the collapse of the electrical system.
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A group of people from Canada and the United States was directed to lead an
investigation that would reveal the causes of the blackout and provide recommendations to stop future incidents like this to ever happen again [25]. The group divided
the blackout into phases and identified different causes for each one of the phases
but it is important to understand that early malfunctions triggered the later ones.
Additionally, the causes were classified based on the nature; some were institutional
issues such as deficient practices, lack of adherence to industry policy, and inadequate
management; and also, human and equipment failures.
There are several entities that are key during the Black out, each one with
different functions. Some of theses entities are:
• First Energy (FE) operates a control area in northern Ohio. This company is
composed of seven utility companies in the region.
• American Electric Power (AEP) operates a control area in Ohio just south of FE.
This company is both a transmission operator and a control area operator [25].
• Mid-West Independent System Operator (MISO) is the reliability coordinator
for a region stretching from Manitoba, Canada in the north to Kentucky in the
south, from Montana in the west to western Pennsylvania in the east [25].
• North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) maintains and develops
operating and planning standards to ensure reliability of a transmission grid.
This organization is divided into ten NERC regions through out Canada and
United States. Fig. 2.8 show the ten regions in NERC and the main connections
that monitor the reliability of the electric grid [25].
• PJM interconnection LLC (PJM)is a Regional Transmission Organization (RTO
). It is currently the largest wholesale electricity market. Perform reliability
coordination functions and along with the MISO are expected to comply with
all aspects of NERC Operating policies [25].
• East Central Area Reliability Coordination Agreement (ECAR) is a region
within the NERC organization that provides reliability oversight [25].
21

Figure 2.8:

NERC Regions and main connections [25]

A large number of causes and/or weaknesses in the sequence of events during
the initiation of the blackout have been identified. These have been classified in four
groups which are greatly summarized as follows:

Group 1. FE and ECAR failed to assess and understand the inadequacies of
FE’s system particularly instability and vulnerability of the Cleveland-Akron area
[25]. As a consequence, the system operated at inappropriate voltage values. It was
found that no review or analysis was done to establish these values and no long-term
planning was studies were done in the system. Also, no extreme condition assessments
were completely neglected.
Group 2. FE had an inadequate situational awareness and did not understand
the deteriorating condition its system. FE did not have the appropriate tools in order
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to ensure that monitoring tools were reflecting the functional state of the system, and
also lacked back-up monitoring tools to visualize the situation [25].
Group 3. FE failed to ensure that tree growth in its transmission line was properly
maintained and monitored, which caused the outage of three FE 345-kV transmission
lines and one 138-kV line [25].
Group 4. The Reliability organization at the interconnected grid (MISO) failed to
provide real-time diagnostic support [25]. The absence of this real-time data from
Dayton Power and Light’s Stuart-Atlanta companies prevented MISO from detect
security violations in FE’s system and execute relief actions. Also MISO lacked an
effective way to identify the location and significance of transmission line breaker
operations to be aware of important line outages.
The study determined that even though the system was electrically secure minutes before the malfunctions began; there was clear evidence that the Cleveland-Akron
areas were highly vulnerable to malfunctions and voltage instability issues [25]. FE
was unable to identify the situation because the company had not perform studies to
determine and understand those vulnerabilities. FE was operating that system very
close to NERC’s operational reliability standards. The system stability could have
been compromised by any number of potentially disruptive scenarios could have. A
system with this little margin to react would leave little room for adjustment, with
few relief actions available to operators in the face of single or multiple contingencies.
The following is a quick snapshot of the series of issues that occurred during the
initial phase of the blackout chronologically, it is not all inclusive:
• It began at 12:15(EDT) when an inaccurate input data rendered Mid-West
Independent System Operator (MISO)’s state estimator ( a system monitoring
tool)ineffective.
• 13 : 31 FE(responsible for the control of Northern Ohio’s area), Eastlake 5
generation unit tripped and shut down automatically.
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• 14:14, the alarm and logging system in FE’s control room failed and was not
restored until after the blackout.
• After 15:05, some of FE’s 345k-V transmission lines began tripping out because
they were touching overgrown trees within the line’s right-of-way areas.
• 15:46, FE, MISO, and neighboring utilities begin to realize that the system was
in jeopardy. At this point, they could have stopped the cascade effect been
avoided by dropping the load around Cleveland and Akron at least 1500 MW.
However, no such effort was made [25].
• Moments later, FE lost key lines in northern Ohio which caused its 138-kV
line to begin failing and in turn loss of FE’s Sammis-Star 345-kV line and it
is this event that triggered the uncontrollable cascade portion of the blackout
sequence. The Sammis-Star line was critical because it shut down the 345 kV
path from eastern to northern Ohio [25].
• By this time, northern Ohio was already blacked out which created an unsustainable burden on lines in adjacent areas. Generating units automatically
tripped by protective relay action to avoid physical damage.
The sequence of events during the initial phase of the blackout is briefly displayed in Fig. 2.9.
There are a large number of other incidents not shown here for brevity reasons,
the snapshot shows how much little time it is required for a large area to be left
without electricity.
The next section describes the Supervisory, Control and Data Acquisition system. The electric grid system operators must keep close and constant watch on the
multitude of things occurring simultaneously on their power system. Because it is
not humanly possible to watch and understand all these events and conditions simultaneously, energy management systems use alarms to bring relevant information to
operator’s attention. The alarms draw on the information collected by the SCADA
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Figure 2.9:

Timeline of events during the initial phase of Blackout. [25]

real-time monitoring system. Therefore, SCADA systems are an important component of the electric system.
2.4

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are extremely im-

portant components to the protection of CI’s to include the electric grid. This system
is responsible for the safe daily operations of the nation’s CI. It controls and supervise systems such as gas pipelines, water a transportation, utilities, refineries, nuclear
plants, utilities, chemical plants, and other operations vital to any country’s economy.
As explained earlier in this chapter, the nature of these infrastructures makes their
protection and assurance of availability vital to both the US and world economies.
SCADA allows a central location to control and monitor a spread distributed
environment, such as oil, electric, gas field, pipeline system, hydroelectric complex
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located hundreds or even thousands of miles from one end to the other. SCADA
systems make changes on distant process controllers (Supervise), open or close valves
or switches, or monitor alarms (Control); and gather data and telemetry information
(Data Acquisition) to allow for a secure facility location operation [3].
SCADA provides real-time information to enable the management of production operations, implement more efficient control paradigms, and improves plant and
personnel safety. SCADA utilizes communication methods to perform its critical
functions such as Directly wired communication, power line carrier, microwaves, radio, and fiber optic communications [6]. This efficient operation of the facility not
only provides more economic performance by reducing cost while operating at optimal conditions, but ensure safety of personnel and millions of people around the
facility [37]. Fig. 2.10 presents a central control station layout.
The rapid escalation of fuel prices has caused the cost of producing power to
escalate rapidly and apparently without control. As a consequence, the efficient and
optimum economic operation and planning of utility and, electric power generation
systems have always occupied an important position in the utility industry. However,
the rising cost is not new to our country; after War World II, the United States began
the installation hydroelectric plants to balance the threat of the already increasing
price of fuel. Parallel to this new source of energy; thermoelectric and nuclear have
also diversified our sources of energy. In addition to this diversification of sources, the
introduction of private companies introduced a new variable into this equation. One
of the few parameters in the industry that seemed too constant was the utilization of
SCADA systems to monitor the efficiency of all these different systems.
The once semi-isolated industrial control offered by SCADA systems which uses
proprietary hardware and software are evolving from this standalone, compartmentalized operations into an exposed, networked architectures. SCADA systems have
evolved and are now part of a network that has greater control and supervisory capabilities of these facilities. The slowly transforming SCADA system uses standard
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Figure 2.10:

SCADA master control station [6]

Commercial off-the shelf (COTS) software and hardware. This “standard” system
has helped in reduction of development, operational, and maintenance costs. In addition to this, SCADA systems have seen a dramatic improvement in their ability
to provide real-time information; critical in the planning, control, supervision, and
decision making functions.
The term SCADA actually defines a system that performs the functions described above; however, it is not closely linked to a specific type of hardware, software, or configuration of both. SCADA systems have been developed by a variety of
companies that have introduced their own equipment and software. Their version of
SCADA may not be inter-operable with other system of the same name. The inter-
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national community also referred to the equipment as SCADA however, it does not
completely equate to the same system everywhere else.
2.5

Brief History of SCADA
SCADA technology began in the 1960s, when industries began monitoring and

controlling instrumentation remotely. SCADA automated systems combine humans,
computers, communications, and procedures [30]. They needed to reduce manpower
requirements for monitoring of sensors and processes [19]. Early implementations of
SCADA systems utilized proprietary software and communications protocols, enormous mainframe computers, and very specialized equipment. Systems not only lacked
inter-operable but also difficult to maintain. The industry lacked a standardization
mainly due to the high reliability expectations of the system, vendors did not want
to rely on someone else’s equipment to meet those expectations.
One of the most important function is the SCADA system is telemetry. Telemetry is the ability to read performance measures from remote locations to evaluate
conditions and perform decision making [3]. In addition to this, activities such as
weather and geophysical research required the collection of data from places where
the presence of a human being was extremely dangerous or not feasible. Or maybe
the facility was located in areas where it was difficult to get crews to live, away from
populated areas. Although, there was technology available to transport telemetry
assets to its remote destinations (i.e., rockets); humans were still needed in the process. This led to the development of communications technologies that allow us to
take readings without threatening lives in the process. And it is this communication
system that is called telemetry.
In the beginning, telemetry made use of wired communications, sometimes using
underground cable. This architecture limited the distance that could be monitored,
the number of locations, and also the geographic location where the cable could be
buried.
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The development of radio signals became the immediate answer to overcoming
hardwiring limitations and slowly made his way in the industry [3]. First, it allowed for
one way communications allowing only to gather data from to remote site and send
to a central location. As a consequence, the central location was not able to send
information back to the remote facility. Nonetheless, radio signals have properties
that make them very attractive to system developers, such as weather immunity.
But the technology was not affordable at the time. As technology evolved and cost
reduced more and more, companies incorporated new technology in their daily critical
operations.
Along with this, radio signals have been improved to the point where two-way
was made possible, this breakthrough allowed the central station to receive data but
also to transmit commands back to the remote terminal [3].
As computer technology matured; computers became the heart of the system
and a trigger for decentralization of the SCADA structure where it made sense to
implement [15]. Control systems consisted of a central minicomputer called Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) that communicated with local controllers (which
could be PLC’s as well) that interfaced with motors, pumps, valves, switches, sensors,
etc.
2.6

Time Constraints
The response time thresholds under which SCADA systems normally operate

are usually very small normally in the range of milliseconds [5]. SCADA is a Wide
Area Protection and Control (WAPaC) system, which gathers information from multiple locations on the system and also provides the controls necessary to respond to
anomalies detected. The location of those supervisory station is usually at great distances from the anomaly origin location and there may be a time delay. Today’s wide
area communication structure are capable of delivering messages from one location
to multiple locations on the system in as little as 6 ms [5]. This is only one of the
different types of delay native to the system. There are several others that are im29

portant to account for such as calculation delay, encryption delay, decryption delay,
etc. Table 2.3 shows the customary time constraint thresholds that must be met for
SCADA and utility protection responses.
Table 2.3:

Typical SCADA Time operating constraints [5]

Systems

Situation

Response Time

Substation IEDs;

Routine power equipment signal

Every 2-4 ms

Primary short

measurement

circuit protection

Local-area disturbance [6]

<4 ms from event detection to sending

and control

notification [14]
4 - 40 ms automatic response time

Backup

Transient voltage instability

Often ≤ 180 ms to convey 14+ trip signals to

protection and

disconnect generators at the top generating

control;

station [16]

Wide-area

Frequency instability, must

Could require < 300 ms response time (by load

protection and

respond faster than generator

shedding) for high rates of frequency decay;

control

governors to trip generators

requires detection within 100 ms to allow

(WAPaC)

instantaneously

operator response in 150 to 300 ms [16]

Dynamic instability

A few seconds

Poorly damped or un-damped

Several seconds

oscillations
Voltage instability

Up to a few minutes

Thermal overload

Several minutes for severe overloads, rarely less
than a few seconds for minor occurrences [16]

SCADA

Emergency event notification

< 6 ms

Routine transactions

< 540 ms [3]

Routine HMI status polling from

Every 2 secs

substation field devices

2.7

SCADA System Components
SCADA it is not a product of a single vendor therefore configurations are not

all exactly the same. Traditionally, each vendor provides its own version of hardware,
software, or communication protocol. SCADA systems have been by nature proprietary systems. However, the components have essentially the same function in the
system.
Today’s SCADA systems are a combination of legacy and modern technology.
New technology and components are used along with older ones that have seen small
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modification to give room for the new components. The SCADA system can be
reduced to a few very major components:
1. Master or Central station which houses:
(a) Master Terminal Unit (MTU) also called server or host computer. This is
the system controller. The MTU is the center of operation. It monitors
the field autonomously, with the proper parameters; it can schedule update
requests or perform instructions, and monitor the remote stations based in
the current state of the system. The MTU has the capability to monitor
hundred of remote locations simultaneously. Depending on the size of the
SCADA system, an MTU can range from a single personal computer(PC)
to a large room containing dozens of computers and operators [15].
(b) Human Machine Interface (HMI), presents information graphically to the
operator. The operator can normally observe a schematic representation
of the plant being controlled [5].
(c) Operational databases, usually linked to the HMI to provide trending, diagnostic data, and management information such as scheduled maintenance
procedures, logistic information, detailed schematics for a particular sensor
or machine, and expert-system troubleshooting guides [5].
2. Substations or remote locations. It is here where most of the supervisory
control and data acquisition occurs, and it is done mostly automatically. However, functions are usually restricted to basic site overriding or supervisory level
intervention [5].which house:
(a) Substation Data Concentrator, as its name states; it puts together the RTU
and IED data from multiple field nodes into a single SCADA address for
each SCADA interface with the MTU [5]. The data concentrator polls
each IED and/or PLC for updates,then collates the data received from the
IED’s performs logic calculations, synchronization, data preprocessing so
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that this data is sent formatted appropriately for the master control station
to translate.
(b) Multiple field devices, such as:
• Power Equipment
• Programmable Logic Controllers PLC, PLCs scan their Input/Output
I/O by reading each I/O point [5]. They are difficult to configure and
cannot be used to control other devices or used as master controllers.
These are not the best choice when the host field station contains a
high number of points to monitor (I/O).
• Remote Terminal Units (RTU). The function of the RTU is to monitor, interpret, execute, and respond to messages received from the
MTU [5]. The execution portion of its functionality may in fact be a
complex process from sending electrical signals, gather data or actually
changing states of equipment in the field. Because of the complexity
of its operation the RTUs are based on computer technology. RTU’s
perform the same function than PLCs or better because RTUs have
the intelligence to control processes. The RTU records data, communicate, perform process identification control, and other functions that
the PLC is completely incapable of performing by itself. RTUs are
capable of controlling process or even multiple process without other
devices intervening such as a controller or master RTU. These device
has the unique capability of using intelligent logic to execute some of
its functions.
• Intelligent Electronic Devices(IED). IED’s main function is to process
incoming analog signals, convert to a digital form, and resend information via their communication link to a substation automation(SA)
controller (also known as a data concentrator) [5]. IEDs can issue
control commands to maintain a safe state when irregularities are detected. IEDs are devices that allows one or more processors to receive
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and send data/control from/to an external device. Additionally, IEDs
can communicate among other IEDs and poll or respond to polls from
other IEDs. These are critical components because they provide the
integration and automation technology within a substation.
.
3. Communication Infrastructure to include modems, radio receiver/transmitters,
Local Area Network. (LAN), equipment sensors and actuators [5]. SCADA
traditionally depended on internal high speed transmission protocol completely
developed for that purpose because of SCADA unique near real-time response
required. SCADA transmission protocols are designed to be very compact, and
even though protocols are completely proprietary to SCADA vendors; they are
standardized among the community. This concept is evolving to move these
legacy protocols to operate over standard digital data transmission, such as
Ethernet, TCP.
2.7.1

SCADA Data Flow Summary.

Data acquisition and monitoring func-

tions begin at the RTU or PLC (and now IEDs) level (Substation); it is at this level
that most of the activity. This includes meter readings and equipment status reports.
Reports are gathered, pre-processed and transmitted by the data concentrator at the
substation and then communicated (Communications infrastructure) to the master
control station.
The master control station is comprised of the supervisory servers and
software responsible for communication with the field devices in substations [5]. At
the MTU the data sent by the data concentrator from field stations is compiled
and preprocessed so that the HMI presents the data to the operator in the form of
display monitor, controls, and other devices. This way the operator can effectively
monitor and if needed, make the appropriate decisions required and interact with the
substation field devices. The HMI software runs on client workstations in the control
center, this may be a single PC depending on the size of the control station.
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2.7.2

A note on Intelligent Electronic Devices.

Because of today’s advance-

ments in microprocessor technology, a single IED is capable of performing numerous
protection, control, and other functions that would require separate RTUs and PLC
devices. Therefore, this new piece of equipment is replacing both of these components,
which are phased out of the system and replaced by the IED. The IED has increased
system reliability dramatically and allowed new system management capabilities such
as predictive maintenance, improved planning, and life extensions [5]. Also, IEDs can
trip circuit breakers to maintain a steady state when anomalies are sensed. Furthermore, with the use of IEDs local assets are able to poll other local assets or answer
poll from other local assets to integrate each separate component in the station and
give each component a situational awareness of the stations as a whole. Moreover,
IEDs are smaller, require less hardwiring, have more intelligent logic embedded, etc.
which make it a better component.
2.8

SCADA applications
SCADA systems are used in a wide number of processes and plants. It ranges

from the essential tasks of supervising and controlling the generations of necessary
toxic substances, to even optimizing productions lines [15]. SCADA is a main component of our CIs and ensures that those primary components of our economy are
running safely on a daily basis. Although this thesis is focused mainly in the SCADA
system used in the electric power industry, in essence the principle approached here
can be applied in a variety of applications, such as nuclear power generation, and
petroleum refining among others. We now briefly describe these two industries in
order to enhance the concept of SCADA system [3].
1. Nuclear Power Generation. This Power plant variation is very similar to a
conventional electric generation plant (i.e. thermo electrical, fossil fuel, etc),
because it generates power with the heat produced by high-pressure steam. As
the steam circulates through the system it causes a mechanical energy which
rotate generators [23]. The difference between these systems is the fuel used to
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elevate the water’s temperature to produce steam. Nuclear plants use materials
such as Uranium 235 to cause a nuclear fission reaction, in which its atoms
are broken down into smaller atoms. This reaction produces a violent reaction
and large amounts of energy by means of heat. Water is used to moderate
the energy/heat produced by this reaction. In doing this,water is is converted
into steam. This steam powers the turbines that generates the electricity. The
diagram in Fig. 2.11 shows in a very simple way the process explained above.
A critical characteristic of nuclear plants is that in, contrast to conventional

Figure 2.11:

Diagram showing how electricity is produced in a Nuclear Plant [23]

sources of energy, a nuclear plant CANNOT be completely shut off. Radioactive
components are continuously producing a large amount of energy, and their
environmental conditions have to be strictly controlled at all times. Water has
to be flowing constantly to ensure that the heat produced is removed from the
system; otherwise accidents can happen with catastrophic consequences [15].

35

The Chernobyl disaster is a prime example of why nuclear plants are considered critical infrastructure and how important strict control and supervision is.
On April 26th, 1986; the Chernobyl nuclear power plant located in the Soviet
Union exploded [12]. The bulk of the casualties were not a result of the explosion but to the radioactive cloud that spread over the atmosphere and carried by
winds to remote regions distant from the area. The exact number of casualties
and injured is unknown.

(a) Chernobyl Reactor on Fire

(b) Chernobyl Plant after accident

(c) Deformed child due to accident

Figure 2.12:

(d) Monument to Accident workers

Images of the Chernobyl Accident [12]
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2. Petroleum Refining. Oil is another element of our critical infrastructure. Our
nation’s economy depends greatly in the supply of this fuel to run almost every
aspect of our daily life. Petroleum refineries are extremely important. Services and goods depend on the transportation by trucks, cars, trains, and other
vehicles that run on petroleum based fuels [15].
Refineries satisfy our demand for oil, by operating at high volumes in a
constant process. Refineries are designed to handle large capacities and run 24
hour, 7 days-per-week [15].
The main function of a refinery is to distill and perform other chemical
reactions on the crude oil; which require that the system operates at temperatures of 500 to 1,000 degrees Fahrenheit and pressures ranging from 150 pounds
per inch to 3,500 [15]. During this process toxic substances in quantities that
exceed those tolerable in the finished product, such as ammonia and hydrogen
sulfide. These substances require constant monitoring to ensure their removal
and safe handling in the process because of their highly corrosive behavior.
We can see that because of the importance of their final products to our
economy, the delicate balance in the distilling process, and the dangerous substances produced in this process; petroleum refineries require constant and strict
control during all stages of the operation [15]. An attack in the SCADA system
protecting this process could result in fires, explosions, human fatalities, and
contamination of large areas. An example of the degree of damage that could
be caused by an accident is the explosion of two ships located at a port close
to Texas City near a refinery. The ships were transporting ammonium nitrate
when they exploded. The explosion caused the refinery to explode and destroy
most of the city and killing 576 people. Fig. 2.13 show a a portion of the
railroad tracks and the debris that accumulated all around area.
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Figure 2.13:
2.9

Texas City, Texas after the refinery explosion of 1947 [22]

System Reliability Analysis
As any other system, SCADA has weaknesses, and sometimes these have caused

failures that have made evident the importance of the system it controls. The North
American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) reported that the system had a total
162 disturbances from 1979 to 1995 [29]. The study analyzed this report and came
up with 11 factors that caused these disturbances. Out of the eleven, the three
major causes of disturbances or failure are severe weather, unanticipated faults, and
equipment failures. The biggest contributors to these disturbances were the real-time
monitoring and operating control systems, communications and information systems,
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and delayed restoration. All these are highly dependent on a robust information
infrastructure and real-time analysis tools [26].
A study done in 2002, point out several bottlenecks in the communications and
information system that allowed the disturbances reported [29]. Among them are a
lack of automatic communication systems to receive rapid and automatic information, inadequate transmission system security and communication facilities, a lack
of advanced communication and emergency communication equipment, and surprisingly, a lack of real-time security analysis and coordinated operation under adverse
conditions. This study shows a great need to develop new tools and technologies that
enable us to improve the reliability of our utility infrastructure [26].
A strange fact is that SCADA lacks a redundant system to improve its reliability. Geographically separated centers containing backups or duplications could hinder
the effects caused by natural disasters or human attacks [15].

2.10

The Threat to Utility Operations
Even though, the NERC reports shows sabotage as a minimum threat, the

nature of the industry where SCADA systems performs and along with introduction of
the SCADA infrastructure to open/corporate networks raises concern and introduces
new threats [16]. Although, there haven’t been many documented SCADA system
exploits; we can reasonably assume that infrastructure problems through SCADA can
occur based on the track record of intrusion to other physical systems.
Technology evolution integration comes at a high cost. The introduction of
standard components (hardware and software components) has also presented new
vulnerabilities to the system [5]. The same vulnerabilities as a standard corporation
network or even a personal computer. Even further, the introduction of the system to
the Internet makes it susceptible to intrusions and attacks from hackers from outside
as well as internal personnel.
As a consequence, SCADA systems, like any other systems, are becoming more
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vulnerable to malicious code such as viruses, Trojan horses, and worms, unauthorized
disclosure of critical data, unauthorized modification and manipulation of critical
data, and Denial of Service attacks. These threats are critical, we have to remember
that SCADA components perform in Real Time or Near Real time, and that their
function requires a prompt response to system variations that could cause catastrophic
consequences under such attacks.
Additionally, we also have to remember that our country is in the middle of
a new type of conflict, asymmetric war; terrorism, where a small number of people
with large amount of resources can plan, without being detected, attacks to our
infrastructure using any means they see fit. This new threat is in addition to many
other threats ranging from conventional direct attack facilities, insider attack (coerced
employees), and again Cyber-attacks. The enormous control and supervision area of
responsibility of a single SCADA node and the type of facilities under their scope
puts them as main possible targets to our country’s new enemy, terrorism. Terrorists
know that causing system failures to our infrastructure could severely damage not
only a single CI but a large geographical region.
2.11

SCADA system security issues
In the report published by NERC in 2002, only 3 out of the 162 SCADA distur-

bances reported between 1975 and 195 were attributed to security (sabotage). However this could be a misleading result, we have to take into consideration that in the
past SCADA was an isolated entity; designed under complete proprietary hardware
and software. This type of design is what is named by some as a Closed Design [4].
As it is, SCADA is insecure by nature, because it was never designed with security
in mind, other performance factors were given higher priority maybe because the secluded and specialized, equipment, protocols, facilities did not warrant the need to
provide a secure system as well [27]. However, the system is now evolving to conventional components; these new trends bring along the vulnerabilities inherent to
components not produced for those critical functions.
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Control systems are increasingly being incorporated with corporate networks
and the Internet. This poses two incompatibilities and security issues by itself. A
system as critical as SCADA was not design to be out in the ”open” and the Internet
does not offer the security required to operate this types of functions.
A study done in 2005 by a SCADA Security Assessment company points out the
following list of security issues [27]:
1. Insufficient Network Isolation, loosely defined access controls, SCADA Data
integration with IT Systems not secured [27].
2. Insecure remote access; with the new open network, users have access through
VPN channels directly of through vendor access, modem connections, or even
directly to SCADA end devices such an RTU [27].
3. SCADA flat IP Structure; this type of structure does not protect against malicious codes and does not limit contractor or insider access [27].
4. Vulnerability Risk assessments miss crucial issues; most assessments done are
done by firms that ignore the specific requirement of CIs [27].
5. SCADA Security Education/Awareness; Information Technology (IT) professionals do not fully understand CIs and development of a new security certification process directed toward CIs is needed [27].
There are several industrial and government-led (Department of Energy and Sandia
Labs) efforts to improve the security of SCADA and control systems in general. A
synergy of fields such as chemical, oil, gas, and water, power are concurrently developing programs focused on system security. The electric sector created the NERC
which is a standards creation and enforcement body that guides the industry and
ensures compliance with these standards [9].
2.12

Utility Industry Intranet
As technology advances are implemented in SCADA systems, new capabilities

are added to current SCADA systems. This technology evolution has dramatically
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increased the amount of data produced. However, the requirement for real-time communication is still required for the system to accomplish its mission successfully. This
particular environment for remote facility management and control lends itself as a
perfect candidate for Internet based or Internet like operations. Nonetheless, it is important to note that security and real-time operations are not what the Internet was
not designed for or is based on; and unfortunately building an Internet-like system
can be extremely expensive [10].
The utility industry has undergone deregulation and the number of utility companies has multiplied as results. Communication between these new players in the
industry is important to ensure that operations remain safe. Cooperation between
market owners must be paramount to maintaining system stability and reliability [16].
A prime example of this deregulation in the utility industry is the Electric Generation Industry. Nowadays, power companies have been forced to split themselves
into different and independent entities with a specific function of generation, distribution, or transmission. The transmission system is typically owned and controlled
by the ISO in each region of the power grid. As a consequence, we may find several
companies competing for the generation and distribution [10].
This new arrangement poses the problem that since transmission is centrally
controlled; only the power grid manager is able to upgrade the transmission infrastructure to meet increasing energy requirements. And this could be a problem, since
for some time the power grid has been operating close to its maximum capacity. Also,
with this many participants in the industry can make failure detection and isolation
in the grid really problematic.
A utility intranet could be designed using many of the standards that the world
wide web posses, but placing more emphasis in security. This is understandable because these standards are widespread, low cost, and will ease migration [28]. However,
there is already some work being done with this in mind, for example “The Utility
Communication Architecture 2.0 and the International Electrotechnical Commission
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(IEC) 61850 began lying the groundwork and establishing a specific utility intranet
for the industry and some of the power substations are already operating on it, on a
limited basis [10].
Finally, there is a new technology that is being widely used in SCADA systems
without much security scrutiny, wireless sensors networks. There is, however, work
done with the goal of standardizing the communication protocols to ensure confidentiality and integrity mechanisms [16].
2.13

What is next in SCADA
The trend is for even more automation because it lowers costs and increases

speed and efficiency. Research and technology development is required to fill the
technology gaps between the problems of today and the industry solution of tomorrow. The direction of SCADA is toward fully automated, distributed, and self-healing
infrastructures [16]. More intelligence and system level security is needed to eliminate the issues associated with optimizing at a local level and man-in-the-middle
limitations.
Also, a point of interest nowadays is the introduction of OLE for Process Control, this is a mechanism for interconneting process control applications running on
Microsoft platforms. This new element in SCADA provides better security features
that the system lacks currently. It facilitates interoperabilty between a mix of heterogeneous devices in a control network, through a set of common interfaces. However,
this product is still under investigation and it is not ready for implementation yet; its
development is still underway [26].
2.14

SCADA Security Evolves
Recently, the community of utility companies has begun to shift from the pro-

prietary hardware, software, and protocols that once dominated the industry toward
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the adoption of open, networked communication standards for control and data acquisition, patterned after the efficiencies and lower cost of technologies in the Internet.
There has been a constant debate in the industry between power engineers, who
have a desire to maintain finely honed processes and speed of operation requirements,
and the Information Technology (IT) personnel familiar with network security mechanisms who defend delay-tolerant office networks and see them as the most secure
measures for protecting systems against threats such as malicious code and online
exploits. Power Engineers raise concern that the majority of common IT security
mechanisms used in networks, like the Internet, will upset the current delicate balance in SCADA networks. Both parties are at odds with respect to the role, priority,
and implementation of security countermeasures. However, nowadays there are efforts
in the Utility Industry guided toward the enforcement of security mechanisms within
the Power Grid and inside SCADA networks.
2.15

The Trust System Concept
The concept of a trust system is to provide a non-proprietary system, or soft-

ware agents that plug into an existing network, somewhat transparently, to perform
the functions of correlating data and identifying risk levels for corresponding events
and status updates that point to negative impacts on utility services. The trust system, at its core, is a software agent performing active security analysis and response.
In a network where nodes have sufficient unused hard drive capacity, memory, and
processing power, the agent would be loaded directly onto the node and provide an
active interface between incoming messages and the nodes code, data, and applications, similar to other software firewalls. It could also be set to monitor outgoing
messages [5].
This collaborative trust system is a hybrid solution comprised of the leading IT
security mechanisms and standard IP protocols while focusing on the distinct requirements of the SCADA community, such as the need to allow increased cooperation and
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information sharing in protection and control systems without disrupting the critical
operation of these systems [5].
2.15.1 How the Trust System works.

The trust system intercepts status

messages or commands from network nodes destined for the master control station
or other nodes in the network. For companies with some legacy nodes, this would
require protocol gateway plug-ins for the trust system to interpret and analyze packets
delivered in different protocols and formats. The node in the network where one of
this devices is placed will be called a trust node [5].
The trust node perform functions of data validation, security risk identification,
alert initiation and response actions when bad data is identified. Additionally, it
assigns data types to each of the good data elements in each message and determines
if the recipient is authorized to read all of the data types in the message. If needed,
it sanitizes the parts of the message that are not allowed to be passed to the recipient
before forwarding it or simply deletes the message altogether. Finally, the data is
then viewable and accessible only to those with the appropriate credentials, need to
know, and rights to access those data elements [5].
2.15.2 Inter-Company and Inter-Area Protection.

Even though the trust

system is not utilized in the present SCADA architectures, this new concept preserves
the fine time constraints native to SCADA, but also increases the security protection
of the system, which is also very important [5].
The trust system can be placed at strategic locations such as connections between adjacent utility companies, outgoing connections from utility companies to
master control stations and engineering centers, and between reliability coordinators
would provide low-cost networks security to any of the different types of SCADA configurations. This is important because situational updates shared between adjacent
utility companies with different SCADA systems will facilitate automatic recognition
of changing conditions that might affect their operations such as load changes versus
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current power generation levels. This earlier warning will expedite decisions and response actions such as load shedding or adjust generation rates to absorb or make up
for the rapid changed in power flows from adjacent companies [5].
This new capability enables neighboring utility companies to update their operational picture and provides them with a wider perspective of power capabilities
and emergency situations. Likewise, control areas can increase their perspective and
provide area-wide status and emergency notifications to Regional Utility Operations
Center, which in turn improve their regional situational awareness [5].
When utilized inside a utility company’s

2.15.3 Internal Traffic Protection.

network, the trust node provides firewall protections between SCADA nodes and
any connected office environment. Moreover, it can ensure fast, reliable delivery of
important real-time and emergency traffic.
2.16

Related Work
The use of mathematical modeling or linear programming to solve power grid

protection problems is novel. However, there exists several examples of analogous
approaches applied to similar situation but unrelated fields.
2.16.1 Combining Quality of Service and Topology Control.

This research

utilizes linear programming to develop a model that simulates the hybrid wireless
network environment [8]. This model accounts for network characteristics such as
latency, power consumption, probability of the transmission being intercepted, and
priority of the link user. The environment has variables, such as the number of users,
the type of links that a user can establish, and user priorities. The problem is defined
as finding the optimal network topology, by determining the links that should and
should not be establish, given the networks characteristics defined above.
2.16.2

Dialable Cryptography for Wireless Networks.

This research objec-

tive was to develop an adaptive cryptographic protocol [7]. This protocol takes into
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account the hardware and bandwidth available to select the optimal cryptographic
strength and algorithm. This idea of dynamically changing the security of a system
is important in wireless ad hoc and sensor networks where critical resources such as
battery life, memory, computational power and bandwidth are not constant. This
research used integer programming to find the best encryption algorithm to use.
2.16.3 Network Design Problem Formulation.

The problem approached is

to find the design that minimizes the total systems cost defined as the sum of the
design cost and the routing cost [24]. Design cost occurs when an edge is added
to the network. We assume that we have a flexibility of designing a networks and
determining its optimal flow or routing.
The modeling assumption considered in this book, is the “uncapacitated network
design problem”. Where multiple commodities need to be routed on the network.
Each commodity has a source and a destination. The problem is formulated as an
optimization problem, where the objective function consists on minimizing the cost
2.17

Chapter Summary
SCADA systems are extremely important for our nation and the world. Critical

infrastructures such as the power grid depend greatly on the efficient performance
of these type of systems to protect their integrity. WAPaC systems such as SCADA
are used in almost every kind of industry but most importantly. According to the
Newton-Evans Research Company, 75% of the world’s gas and oil pipelines of 25 km
or more in length are monitored and controlled by SCADA systems. Application is
not limited to CI sector processes.
SCADA moves toward automation because it increases effectiveness and reduces
cost. However, Internet’s technology was developed ignoring security risks and vulnerabilities for the most part. Unfortunately, from a security perspective, SCADA is
as vulnerable as a telephone line can be.
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The new trend of utilizing COTS products increases the risk because most of
these products were designed for small scale use or for applications not as critical,
again in fields where security may not be as crucial as it is in the management and
control of our vital infrastructure.
SCADA systems are so important that they impact level I infrastructures – water, power, energy, and telecommunications. However, SCADA is also is also employed
in other critical infrastructures such as transportation, food, and agriculture.
Scenarios such as massive power blackouts, oil refinery explosions, or waste
mixed with drinking water due to SCADA system compromise, failure, or degradation
have the potential to inflict significant damage to human life and critical infrastructure at local, regional, or national levels. If synchronized with a physical attack or the
aftermath of a natural disaster, cyber attacks on SCADA systems could greatly escalate fatalities in a region already rendered unable to coordinate a timely response or
ill-prepared to offer necessary shelter, clean water, and contamination control, perfect
methods for inciting terror once again in America [5].
There have been incidents that have not been widely publicized that reflect the
interest of terrorists to attack our industry. For examples, In 2001, the U.S. military
discovered evidence in Afghanistan that al-Qaida terrorists were researching SCADA
systems [21]. All this information proves that there is an impending need to protect
these systems by developing new concepts that improve and enforce security tasks
but parallel to this ensure the compliance of environment strict time constraints. The
trust system is a viable device adds important security functions. Also, when located
at strategic locations trust nodes can stop cascading effects from spreading to larger
regions and diminish their consequences.
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III. Methodology

T

his chapter has two goals, the first one is to provide a description of the tools
used during the research. The second goal is to describe the methodology

adopted to obtain accurate and meaningful results that closely approximate real world
conditions and operations. In doing so, this chapter explains the model and scenarios
utilized to simulate communications that would be present in the implementation of
a collaborative control network (trust system). Ultimately, this research proposes
power grid/SCADA network configurations which increase the level of security by
adding the trust node security mechanism to the network, by compartmentalizing
the network into subnetworks (or domains) protected by these trust nodes placed at
strategic locations.
This chapter first describes in broad terms what the problem is, and makes an
attempt at emphasizing its importance to our country. Then, it will graphically show
what is the research objective by showing how the input network looks like and how
it would look, after the input is processed in the optimizer.
3.1

What is the problem?
The United States faces a new type of conflict, terrorism. Terrorists intend to

achieve their ideological goals by creating fear or terror by deliberately targeting noncombatants, or any structure that weakens our country. These procedures or “tactics”
violate international treaties, and therefore are considered to be unlawful violence and
acts of war. The use of unconventional methods presents a new type of threat to our
country, to which we may not fully ready. A threat the could potentially attack our
country within our borders. The enemy can launch low visibility attacks without the
need for a large logistical footprint by utilizing day-to-day equipment and material
to perpetrate attacks with catastrophic repercussions. These type of aggressions are
mainly directed towards innocent civilian population and critical infrastructures.
The protection of our electric power grid is of paramount importance. One way
to do this is to develop the technology and/or methodology necessary to strengthen
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and protect our infrastructure against these types of attacks. When equipment malfunctions, unauthorized activity is detected, the security infrastructure should isolate
the anomaly from the rest of the network to stop it from spreading to larger sections
of the network. As a consequence, when a local failure occurs, it does not turn into an
incident of major proportions, in the case of the power grid, into a regional blackouts.
3.2

Problem description and Research Objective
The problem described above is broadly introduced here; details are covered in

subsequent sections of this chapter. The problem is to convert a power grid or SCADA
network topology such as the one shown in Fig. 3.1. This figure shows the input configuration to the model being tested. This network has minimal security protection.
It consists of a typical network topology containing the connections between buses or
substations.

Figure 3.1:

Current network topology used as input for this research

The topology shown above is processed and our result will be a configuration
showing the characteristics shown in Fig. 3.2. Here, the buses are grouped into
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domain and the branches communicating domains are protected by trust nodes (see
section 2.15).

Figure 3.2:

Network topology produced showing domains and trust node placement

The goal of this research is to show in a simulated environment that security
of the network can be strengthen by first fielding the trust system described above
and second, by dividing a network into smaller clusters, called “domains,” in order to
isolate anomalies or intrusions detected. In order to show this, a mathematical model
of the problem will be built and translated into a software tool that at the end will
receive real-life-network data as input.
This program uses real world power grid representative data, outputs a network
configuration that has used the concepts described above of network compartmentalization and strategic placing of trust nodes. For purposes of this research, a node is
considered a “strategic location” if its positioning within the domain allows the trust
node to monitor all traffic (herein called messages) between domains. A solution is
feasible if it satisfies the above but also if timing constraint are not violated for any
traffic input.

51

3.3

IEEE Test Case Data
The data that was used for the research was obtained from the University of

Washington (UW). The UW Power System Case Archive is a repository of data sets
that in some cases represent actual Power Systems such as the New England Power
System which is represented in the 30 Bus Dynamic Test Case [31]. The data is stored
in the standard “IEEE Common Data” format. Each data set has several sections
representing information from different devices in the power grid. For example, branch
data, bus data, or loss zones data. For the purpose of this research, we will only use the
bus and branch Data. Buses represent nodes in the network or substation locations,
and branches are the connection between buses. There are two different types of data
available:
1. Power Flow Systems Test Case Archive. This data set is also called static, and
it describes the state of the system at a specific point in time. There are five
data sets available with in this test case:
(a) 14 Bus (nodes). This IEEE Bus Test Case represents a portion of the
American Electric Power System in the Midwestern, US. as of February
1962 [31]. Figure 3.3 shows the diagram represented by the test case text
file.

Figure 3.3:

Diagram of network represented by the 14 bus test case [31]
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(b) 30 Bus. Fig.3.4 presents the network represented by this IEEE Bus Test
Case data which represents a portion of th American Electric Power System
in the Midwestern,US, as of December, 1961 [31].

Figure 3.4:

Diagram of network represented by the 30 bus test case [31]

(c) 57 Bus. Fig.3.5 shows the IEEE Bus Test Case which represents a portion
of the American Electric Power System in the Midwestern,US, as it was in
the early 1960’s [31].

Figure 3.5:

Diagram representing the 57 bus test case [31]
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(d) 118 Bus. This IEEE Bust Test Case represents a portion of the American Electric Power System in the Midwestern, US, as of December, 1962.
Fig.3.6 shows the diagram represented by the test case text file [31].

Figure 3.6:

Diagram Representing the 118 Bus Test Case [31]
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(e) 300 Bus. This data set was developed by the IEEE Test Systems Task
Force [31]. However, it is not clear if the data represents an actual power
system. Fig. 3.7 presents the topology represented in the test case data.

Figure 3.7:

Diagram representing the 300 bus test case [31]
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2. Dynamic Test Cases. The data set represents the behavior of the system through
a period of time. It reflects reactions to voltage variations or other changes that
affect the grid and how components reacted to them. This data set was archived
from several sources, no diagrams are available for either of these cases:
(a) 17 Generator, 162 Bus power flow dynamic stability test case, which includes a 162 bus power flow data file. Initially distributed by Iowa State
University [31].
(b) 30 Bus “New England” Dynamic Test Case. This data set was obtained
from Arizona State University. And it is representative of New England
Physical Power System [31].
(c) 50 Generator 145 Bus Dynamic Stability Test Case initially distributed by
Iowa State University [31].
3.4

Approach
Since our goal is to maximize the number of domains created. Also, the number

of trust nodes that can be placed without violating the strict response times(i.e. time
thresholds) that the network is bounded by to ensure safe operations. This problem statement fits the description of an optimization problem. In mathematics and
computer science, an optimization problem is the problem of finding the best solution (maximum, minimum) within a set of feasible solutions while enforcing system
constraints.
Before we begin building a model, we need to make sure that we have all the
information/data needed to perform our research. And to do this, preprocessing of
the raw test data was needed to make sure it was in the format required to be used
as the model input.
3.4.1

Data Preprocessing.

The raw data sets do not contain all the infor-

mation needed to replicate the network with nodes and edges. The data sets contain
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what nodes are connected, however, they do not contain the distance between nodes
or the delay between nodes. Therefore, additional research needed to be done to
derive the distances between nodes (or buses).
In order to derive the distance and/or delay between nodes (stations) a small
program was written. The process used in this program to derive distance is described
below:
1. From the IEEE raw data, branch section, extract “Branch Resistance R, per
unit” is stored in column seven of the data. Resistance is measured in ohms, Ω.
2. ρ is the static resistivity ( Ω¦ m). Resistivity is defined below. This value is a
constant dependent on the material being used. It is assumed aluminum with
iron core a value of 2.50188x10−8 Ωm. Equation 3.1 shows this formula.
3. Area is the cross-sectional area of the material (square meters, m2 ). Research
show that the Area is 1.25 inch2 which converted to meters is constant value of
.00080642m2 was the value used for our calculations [11].
4. l ( or distance) is the length of the piece of material ( meters, m). This is
the information that we are interested on. We obtain distance by using the
resistivity formula and solving for l. Equation 3.2 shows the formula used to
obtain distance.
5. Multiply this value by 3. The reason for this is that the cable used in the
transmission of electricity is composed of three wire [11].
6. Use the absolute value of the number on previous step (distance in meters (m))
to convert to time (delay) in seconds using the formula for velocity, and solve
for time. For purposes of this research, we assume that fiber optic is used in
m
the communication line, therefore we used the speed of light (299, 792.458 msec
).

Equation 3.3 shows the formula used to obtain time.
Resistivity (ρ) Also known as specific electrical resistance is a measure of how
strongly a material opposes the flow of electric current. The electrical resistance of a
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wire would be expected to be greater for a longer wire, less for a wire of larger cross
sectional area, and would be expected to depend upon the material out of which the
wire is made. A low resistivity indicates a material that readily allows the movement of
electrical charge. The standard unit of electrical resistivity is the ohm*meter (Ω*m).
The formula for electrical resistivity is:

ρ=R∗

Area
l

(3.1)

l =R∗

Area
ρ

(3.2)

Distance
Speed

(3.3)

Solve for l and we get:

T ime =

In order to better illustrate this, I will describe how a delay was derived.
1. From the raw data set, the program reads column seven from the branch data
set portion (i.e. resistance). For this example we will use the actual value
R = .01938 Ω.
2. From our assumptions, we use the resistivity value for aluminum which is
2.50188x10−8 Ωm and the cross sectional area of the conducting medium, 0.00080642m2 .
and apply equation 3.2 as follows:

l = .01938Ω ∗

0.00080642m2
= 624.69 m
2.50188x10−8 Ωm
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(3.4)

3. Multiply by 3 yields 1, 874.07m
4. Apply equation 3.3 assuming the speed of light as follows:

T ime =

1, 874.07m
−6
m = 6.25124 x10 sec
299, 792, 458 sec

(3.5)

5. Convert to milliseconds to get:

6.25124 x10−3 msec
6. Last, we round off to use the integer part of this number (i.e. 6). This number
will the used as propagation delay in the model input.
This process was completely automated using the program described above.
This program produces the list of nodes and branches connecting them with their
corresponding delays. After this it prompts the user to enter desired source node
and a destination node, calculate the shortest path and appends it to the network
file. With this, we are now capable of taking any IEEE data format test case, derive
distances/delays between buses and output the networks input file necessary for our
research.
3.4.2

Mathematical Programming or Optimization.

In mathematics, the

simplest case of optimization, or mathematical programming, refers to the study of
problems in which one seeks to minimize or maximize a real linear function by systematically choosing the values of real or integer variables from within an allowed set
or linear constraints [8]. Optimization is a small subset of this field which comprises
a large area of applied mathematics and generalizes to the study of means to obtain
”best available” values of some objective function given a defined domain where the
elaboration is on the types of functions and the conditions and nature of the objects
in the problem domain.
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In summary; in optimizing a problem the goal is to seek a minimum or maximum value for the objective function by systematically choosing the values of real or
integer variables within an allowed set. And this allowed set is defined mainly by the
constraints given, which can be set to not to exceed a certain amount or not to go
below a set amount of time, money, speed, resources, etc, depending on the nature of
the problem.
Mathematical programming has been divided into different subfields depending
on the type of degree its objective functions and constraint may have, and the values
that the decision variables in the program can take. Some of these subfields are:
• LP - Linear problems have components (i.e. objective function, constraints, and
unknown variables) defined as linear functions.
• MILP - Mixed integer linear problem; An optimization problem which involves
both integers and continuous variables [36].
• QP - Quadratic problems; It is the problem of optimizing a quadratic objective
function of several variables subject to linear constraints on these variables [36].
• MIQP - Mixed integer quadratic problems [36].
• QCQP - Quadratically constrained quadratic problems [36]
• CNLP - Convex non-linear problems [36]
In essence, optimization problems regardless of its subfield are made up of three
main components:
1. Objective Function, this is the mathematical function that we need to optimize (maximize or minimize), such that we find the “best solution”. For
example, we may want to maximize profit or minimize cost of operations.
2. Set of Variables, which affect the value of the objective function. In a transportation problem the variables can be cost of fuel, distance traveled, number
of vehicles available, etc.
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3. Set of Constraints, which establish boundaries or limits to those variables.
For example, monthly budget for fuel expenses. The purpose of these is to define
the set of feasible solutions or solutions that fit within the boundaries of the
constraints.
3.4.3

Linear Programming.

Historically, the first optimization technique is

known as steepest descent or gradient descent which is used to find a local minimum
of a function, and goes back to the German mathematician and scientist Johann Carl
Friedrich Gauss who contributed greatly to the field of mathematics and several other
fields of science [36]. Linear Programming (LP) is a technique for optimization of a
linear objective function. This function is bounded by linear equalities and
inequalities called constraints.
LP was developed by George Dantzig in the 1940’s [36], the term is not in any
manner linked to computer programming; it was labeled as such because of an acquisition “program” by the Unites States military which refers to proposed training
and logistic schedules. It was this term that help the project receive federal government funding, since it was immediately associated with high-technology research
areas which were considered to be of extreme importance.
When solving problems utilizing this technique a model is created by extracting
the characteristics of the problem under the problem domain. Some of the characteristics can be speed, traffic load, number of nodes, distance between nodes, network
delay, etc. The technique evaluates the requirements against constraints utilizing linear equations. The goal is to accurately design an objective function that is optimized
subject to the constraints natural to the problem being optimized (i.e. response times,
propagation delays, etc). The end result should be a set of mathematical expressions
collectively called a mathematical model that represents the real world problem being
solved.
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3.4.4

Mathematical Model.

The following is a description of this research.

First, is the problem domain narrative. Most of the information in this section has
been discussed in Chapter 2, however the problem domain narrative has not been
edited to present the model in its entirety.
3.4.4.1

Problem Description.

The problem consists of an input

network that represents a Power Grid or a SCADA facility; the facilities connection
and their connection delays. Different types of background traffic are transmitted
through the network with corresponding different response times (or thresholds) depending on the criticality of the message traffic. The nodes can represent terminals in
the Power Grid or SCADA network components connected by edges, which represent
the distance and/or delay between the network components. For our purposes if the
network has an edge, (j, k); then a transmission between nodes j and k is possible in
both directions. The branches (or edges) between the nodes represent delays that are
calculated outside the model. It is important that the delay is always less than the
response time expressed as a threshold.
In order to increase the security of the network (i.e. grid, or SCADA facility)
the layout needs to be subdivided into Domains. This compartmentalization isolates
attacks or malfunctions so that they can be dealt within the domain affected. This
prevents a rapid cascade effect through out the grid/facility.
Additionally, a new security mechanism, called “trust node” (tN) is “installed”
at strategic buses. This device inherently adds delay to the network due to its functioning. The number of trust nodes is limited. As clarification; even though it is
called a trust node, it IS NOT a node or bus, it is a device that is installed at the
bus to add security to the communications flowing through that bus in the network.
tN’s represent pieces of hardware/software that is added to that node, to increase
security functions. Section 2.15 has a more detailed description of the trust node or
trust system.
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The goal is to be able to partition the network in as many domains as possible
(maximize), and install as many trust nodes as possible without causing any type of
traffic to exceed its corresponding response time. The response time is critical for a
safe operation of the facility.
The input is a text file that provides the components of a graph such as a set of
branches (or edges), a set of buses (nodes), a set of delays in those branches, traffic
represented by its path and its type. Also, the input provides constants that are used
in the optimization process.
Algorithm domain description:
Consider a Network represented by a graph G, and nodes
• Let Graph: G(Bus, Branch) Where:
– Let Bus denote the set of Buses (i.e. Vertices).
– Let Branch denote set of Branches (i.e. Edges). This variable is defined
as an array of integers with a capacity determined by bus.
The specific variables utilized in the model are the following:
• Input Variables:
– Let nBus be the integer number of buses in the network.
– Let nBranch denote the integer number of branches the network has in it.
– Let nPath denote the integer number of paths in the network.
– Let nTrafficType denote the different type of traffic types in a SCADA
system
– Let responseTimes denote the response times the need to be enforced for
each type of traffic in a SCADA system. These are obtained from previous.
– Let tDelay denote the delay added to the network when a trust node is
added to a bus.
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• The indexing sets are:
– Let bus denote the indexing set for buses. This is initialized as an unbounded range.
– Let busRange denote the indexing set for buses.
– Let maxDomainNum denote the maximum number of domains that can
be created.
– Let DomainRange denote the indexing set for the number of domains.
– Let minNode InDom denote the minimum number of buses (or nodes) that
are needed to be assigned to a domain.
– Let max TNode denote the maximum number of trust nodes available.
– Let tNodeRange denote the indexing set for the set of trust nodes.
– Let pathRange denote the indexing set for the set of paths.
• Let delay indexed by the set of buses represent the delay in the branch connecting those buses.
• Let busInDomain denote the domain number where each bus has been assigned
to.
• Let domBranch denote the incidence matrix for each domain created, reflecting
only the buses and branches included in that specific domain. This is represented
with a three dimensional variable; where the third dimension corresponds to the
domain number. The first and second dimensions represent the buses in that
domain. This matrix is assumed to be bidirectional.
• Let domainNodeCnt denote the count of the number of buses/nodes contained
in a domain. This variable is initiated as follows:

∀k ∈ domainRange : domainN odeCntk =

X
j∈busRange

• Let totDomain denotes the count of all domains created.
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busInDomainj,k

• Let unusedBranchs denote the branches that are not inside or part of a domain.
These could be used to calculate domain entry/exit points or buses where a
trust node may be placed.
• Let tNodeLocation denote the node number where a trust nodes device has been
installed.
• Let tNodeLocationTot denote the sum of trust nodes used.
• Let tNodeCnt denote a count of trust nodes being placed or utilized.
• Let trustDelayArray denote the added delay to each path by the total sum of
trust nodes in that path. It is initialized by multiplying the delay incurred by
adding a trust node and the tNodeLocationTot, such as:
∀p ∈ pathRange, ∀j ∈ busRange :
trustDelayArrayj,p = tN odeLocationT otj ∗ tDelay
• Let trustDelayResult denote the sum of the delays incurred when accounting for
the trust nodes installed along the path of the traffic. This variable is Initialized
as:
∀p ∈ pathRange : trustDelayResultp =

X

traf f icT rustk,p ∗ tDelay

k∈busRange

• Let traffic denote a matrix containing the traffic path incidence matrix, or in
other words, contains the edges included in a path.
• Let trafficType denote a numeric array whose values determine the traffic type
for the path in the same index position in the variable traffic. This number is
looked up in the responseTimes variable to evaluate the appropriate threshold.
For Example, if trafficType contains a 3 in location 1, then the path in location
1 of the variable traffic is of type 3. And it will use the threshold stored in the
variable responseTimes(3).
• Let trafficIncidenceArray denotes the nodes included in the path being evaluated, the values in the array are 0 or 1 (Boolean Matrix).
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X

∀p ∈ pathRange : trafficIncidenceArrayj,p =

traf f icb,j,p

b∈busRange

• Let trafficDelayIncidence denote the incidence matrix of the traffic delay incidence after path input. This variable stores the delays incurred during a path.
It is initialized by multiplying the delay between two nodes j and k times the
positions in the array traffic where a 1 has been stored. This initialization is
accomplished by:
∀j, k ∈ busRange, ∀p ∈ pathRange :
traf f icDelayIncidencej,k,p = traf f icj,k,p ∗ delayj,k
• Let trafficDelayIncidenceArray denote the sum of each of the delays per path.
It is initialized utilizing the delays on each node as follows:
∀p ∈ pathRange, ∀j ∈ busRange :
trafficDelayIncidenceArrayj,p =

X

trafficDelayIncidencek,j,p

k∈busRange

• Let trafficTrust denote the delay added to the path when it traverses a node
that has a trust node in it.
• Let trafficDelayResult denote the total delay per path. This is calculated by
adding the sum of the delays on the branches included in a path or traffic. This
is initialized as follows:
∀p ∈ pathRange :

X

trafficDelayIncidenceArrayk,p

k∈busRange

• Let trafficResult denote the delay on a path. This is calculated by adding the
delay incurred by the traffic alone and the delay incurred when a trust node was
added to the path. Since this delay stores the total delay, it is constrained to
be less than threshold. It is an array and each element represents each path’s
total delay.
∀p ∈ pathRange : trafficResultp = trustDelayResultp +trafficDelayResultp
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The following assumptions are made:
• Delay is bidirectional:
delayi,j = delayj,i
• Branches are bidirectional:
∀m, n ∈ bus : n ≤ m ⇒ branchm,n = branchn,m
• The incidence matrix for each domain:
∀d ∈ domainRange; n, m ∈ busRange : domBranchm,n,d = domBranchn,m,d
Subject to the following constraints(CT):
•

– The Total delay (trafficResult) on every message (traffic) has to be less
than or equal to the response time allowed by the system (threshold). The
response time is different depending on the type of traffic. (CT 1)
– The number of nodes per domain can either be 0 (if not being used) or
greater than or equal to minNodesPDom(i.e. semi-continuous ). (CT 2)
– Every bus has to be assigned to exactly ONE Domain(Sub-Network) (CT
3)
– Every node has to be assigned to a domain.
– The number of unused branches has to be greater than the difference from
the total branches in network and the sum of the branches that have been
assigned to a domain.(CT 4)
– The number of buses assigned to domains has to be less than or equal to
the total number of buses. (CT 5)
– Every trust node may only be assigned to one bus in the network.(CT 6)
– The sum of the buses in each domain is less than the total number of buses
in the network
– The sum of all buses on each domain is equal to the total number of buses
in the input Network (Bus).(CT 10)
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– Every node in the network can have a maximum of ONE trust node assigned to it. (8)
– Every bus can only contain at most ONE trust node. (CT 9.iv)
– busInDomain, domBranch, tNodeLocation, tNodeCnt, totDomain, unusedBranchs are binary variables. (CT 9)
Objective Function: Maximize the number of total domains created.
3.4.4.2

Mathematical Model:

Objective Function:
M aximize

domainSize
X

totDomaind

d=1

Subject to:
1. ∀p ∈ pathRange : trafficResultp ≤ threshold
2. ∀k ∈ domainRange : (domainN odeCntk > minN ode InDom) ∨
(domainN odeCntk = 0)
3.

X

∀j ∈ busRange :

busInDomainj,k = 1

k∈domainRange

4. ∀j, k ∈ busRange : unusedBranchsj,k ≥ branchj,k −
5. ∀k ∈ domainRange :

X

X

domBranchj,k,d

d∈domainRange

busInDomainj,k ≤ nBus

j∈busRange

6. ∀j ∈ tN odeRange : tN odeCntj ≤ 1
X
X
nBus
7. ∀b ∈ busRange :
tN odeLocationt,b ∗
≥
unusedBranchsk,b
2
t∈tN odeRange
k∈busRange
X
8. ∀b ∈ busRange :
tN odeLocationt,b ≤ 1
t∈tN odeRange

9. Binary Variables:
i. ∀j, k ∈ busRange : unusedBranchsj,k ∈ {0, 1}
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X

ii. ∀j ∈ tN odeRange : tnodeCntj =

tN odeLocationj,k ∧

k∈busRange

tN odeCntj ∈ {0, 1}
iii. ∀j ∈ busRange, ∀k ∈ domainRange : busInDomainj,k ∈ {0, 1}
iv. ∀j ∈ tN odeRange, ∀k ∈ busRange : tN odeLocationj,k ∈ {0, 1}
v. ∀j, l ∈ busRange, ∀k ∈ domainRange : domBranchj,l,k ∈ {0, 1}
vi. ∀d ∈ domainRange : totDomaind ∈ {0, 1}
busRange domainRange

10.

X

X

j=1

k=1

busInDomainj,k = Bus

3.4.5 Application used for model development.

The next step in the process

was to determine what type software was needed to perform optimization and
translate the mathematical model defined above into a language. To accomplish
this, the optimizer Xpress-MP environment was used. This environment
implements a language called Mosel [1].
Mosel is a language that is both a modeling and a programming language. This
allows the environment to combine the modeling and the programing of the
algorithm. Mosel language code is then processed using what is called an optimizer,
in this case Xpress-Optimizer which is what takes the language and solves the
problem represented in it [1].
Mosel allows the user to define models in a form that is close to algebraic
notation and to solve them in the same environment. The optimizer utilizes several
algorithms to solve problems:
1. Simplex methods: In an LP problem, the region defined by a set of linear
constraints is known as the feasible region. The simplex method is based on
the fact that the optimal solution lies on the boundary of the feasible region.
Usually, simplex methods consider solutions at the vertices on the boundary of
the feasible region and proceed from one vertex to another until an optimal [8].
solution has been found, or the problem proves to be unfeasible or unbounded.
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(a) Dual simplex methods. The dual simplex algorithm is usually much
faster than the primal simplex algorithm if the model is not infeasible or
near infeasibility [8].
(b) Primal simplex method, however, is usually the best choice for problems
that are likely infeasible as it makes determining the cause of the
infeasibility less difficult [8].
The difference between the primal and dual simples methods lies in which
vertices they consider and how they iterate.
2. Newton Barrier method. This is an interior method because it iterates moving
from one point to the next within the interior of the feasible region.
Approaching the boundary of the region is penalized, therefore the process
cannot leave the feasible region [8]. Interior point methods usually give a
solution lying strictly within the interior of the feasible region, this solution
can only be an approximation to the true optimal vertex solution. As a
consequence, how close we want to be to the optimal solution and not the
number of decision variables, influences the number of iterations required to
reach that optimal approximation. This method usually completes in a similar
number of iteration as the simplex method, regardless of the problem size.
3.4.6

Input of Model in Optimizer and Validation.

As the model was being

entered, the approach was to subdivide the problem into different phases and build
on the previous phase to implement the new phase. Each one of the phases
represent each one of the goals that were needed to accomplish the optimization.
The phases that the model was divided onto are the following:
i Subdivision of input network into domains. Nodes inside a domain have to be
contiguous.
ii Placement of trust nodes in strategic nodes. We want the model to place the
maximum number of trust nodes in the network. However, trust nodes have to
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be located in nodes where they can monitor incoming and outgoing messages
between domains. Moreover, the model has to ensure that by placing these
trust nodes the response time threshold is not violated.
iii Multiple traffic processing and response time compliance. The model should be
able to process multiple messages with different response time thresholds and
ensure neither of the thresholds is exceeded. For purposes of this research, it is
assumed none of the paths in the networks violate the established operating
time constraints. The reason for this assumption is that the IEEE test input
network represent an actual version of a portion of the power grid. Therefore,
it makes sense that this assumption will hold; otherwise the power grid
network would mis-operate under normal conditions.
Once each phase was entered into XPress-MP, the next step was to validate that
portion of the model entered. In order to do this, the model was run against small
networks; starting from three, four, five, seven nodes and a relatively small number
of branches as well. These smaller networks were solved manually to make sure that
the model was satisfying all the constraints entered in it. When XPress-MP
produced different answers, they verified to make sure that there was not another
feasible answer that was looked over and that the model had found which was
correct as well.
3.5

Response Times or Thresholds

The response times utilized in this research were obtained from Fig. 2.3 and are
shown in Table 3.1. This values were entered as input to the model in a separate file
containing an array holding these values. Additionally, a second file containing the
values in the second row represent experimental values used to test the model
against lower time constraints. The resulting configurations were compared between
both response time files.
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Table 3.1:
Time 1
Time 2
3.6

2
.2

4 40
.7 .25

Time Constraint in milliseconds
Time in milliseconds
180 300 10000 10000 36000 10000 6
180 30
10
10
36
100 2

540 2000
540 1000

Summary

This chapter discussed the approach taken to solve the problem and the steps
followed to execute this research. We started from getting the raw data files and
performing calculations on it, to derive information that was needed. It also covered
the basis for the optimization technique used on that data and the optimizer
software utilized on the data. Next, it described shortly how the mathematical
model was built and entered into the program. And finally, it described the process
used to make sure that the model was providing correct results before it was used in
larger scenarios.
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IV.

Analysis and Results

T

his chapter provides details of the results of the optimization trials of our
trust node placement algorithm on different network configurations based on

standard IEEE test cases. It presents calculations of the best configurations that the
Mosel optimizer produced. These resulting configurations are representative of
actual systems that the trust system could help to secure in the electric grid.
Moreover, this type of optimization model could be utilized to configure any
network that has the same characteristics, constraints, and assumptions.
There are a large number of results that are not shown in this document for
purposes of brevity; more specifically, the smaller scenarios are excluded. The first
set of runs shown here will have the results obtained from running the network in
Linux and Windows. Finally, it was not possible to show the larger (i.e., 57 bus)
scenarios because their running times were too large given the computing resources
available.
4.1

XPress-MP Platforms

The research facility had two different licenses for the XPress-MP optimization
software, a Windows version and a Linux version. As a comparison, a section of this
chapter will focus on version result differences. The same exact scenario will be
compared between Windows and Linux test runs.
4.2

Results analyzed, and questions answered

During this chapter, the analysis will show that it is possible to utilize the trust
system suggested in Chapter 2, to enhance system security, despite the trust system
delays introduced, when careful optimization constraints are enforced. The results
analyzed present suggested configurations that use careful network
compartmentalization, which in addition to the security protection in the trust
system, also helps to isolate attacks and other malfunctions that cause system
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instabilities. Additionally, an evaluation of running times is provided between
scenarios.
For purposes of this research, a successful output configuration represents a
correct domain grouping in the network which implies that the nodes are connected
to each other and that a domain does not contain less nodes than the minimum
entered for that run. Also, that the trust systems have been placed at nodes or
buses where the security of the domains that they were placed in is increased.
Finally, there should be not more than the maximum number of allowed trust nodes
placed for the run.
4.3

Input File

As described in Chapter 3, the Mosel model received a text file as input. This
file describes the characteristics of a “real life” network, which was assumed to
parallel the same nodes and edges as in the raw IEEE test case. This file is the
product of the data pre-processing program described in Section 3.4.1, which takes
the raw data and to arrive at a corresponding communication network.
The file naming convention used for input files is the following:
carlos AA BB CC DD EE.dat
AA= Number of nodes in the network.
BB= Number of branches in the network
CC= Number of messages or path traversal**
DD= Network variation number (used mainly to test the model)
EE= Never used
** For purposes of this research, a message represents a path of buses traversed.
The model uses these paths entered to evaluate their total delay and verify that the
path has not violated its timing constraint. These paths are part of the input file.
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4.4

Result evaluation

The information needed to interpret the result is described in this section.
4.4.1

Output file.

The output file generated by the model contained a

description of the scenario run and the solution found during after the optimization
was completed.
The output included the following information:
1. Scenario ran
2. Threshold file used during the trial
3. Incidence matrices for network as well as for domains created
4. Locations in the network where trust nodes were placed
5. Communication Protection and control traffic entered
6. Delay induced by trust nodes
7. Threshold values used
8. Delay caused by traversing the path
9. Total delay (trust node Delay + Path Delay)
4.4.2

Measurements, Units and Calculations.

IEEE raw test case

information is provided using the English measurement system (i.e. inches, miles,
etc). All the information used in this research was converted to the metric system.
The delay unit used for network input was milliseconds (msec). However, the run
times produced by the model are given in seconds (secs).
4.4.3 Figure interpretation.

The figures in this chapter showing the resulting

configurations are interpreted as follows:
• The colored/shaded regions represent the domains formed. And the buses
inside this regions belong to this domain.
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• The red/dark buses represent a bus where a trust node has been placed.
4.5

Observation variables

The variables being modified on each scenario to observe their effect on the
result produced are the following:
• Minimum number of nodes per domain or sub-network (Section 3.2).
• Maximum number of trust nodes available.
By running scenarios with different value for these variables, it was expected
that different configurations would be produced by the model.
We now evaluate individually the effects caused by the variables described in
Section 4.5.
4.6

Model Variables Effects

The first variable evaluated in this section is the minimum number of buses on
each domain, and the second is the maximum number of trust nodes allowed during
that trial. The figure sequence shown in Fig. 4.1 demonstrate the effects caused by
the modification of the variables that determine the maximum number of trust
nodes and the minimum number of buses per domain. This set of trials were run
using the messages shown in five-message section.
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(a) 2 trust Nodes, 2 nodes per do- (b) 2 trust nodes, 4 nodes per do- (c) 2 trust nodes, 7 nodes per domain
main minimum
main minimum
minimum

(d) 4 trust Nodes, 2 nodes per do- (e) 4 trust nodes, 4 nodes per do- (f) 4 trust nodes, 7 nodes per domain
main minimum
main minimum
minimum

(g) 7 trust Nodes, 2 nodes per do- (h) 7 trust nodes, 4 nodes per do- (i) 7 trust nodes, 7 nodes per domain
main minimum
main minimum
minimum

Figure 4.1:
4.6.1

Configuration changes using different input values on the same scenario
Minimum number of buses per domain.

This variable determines the

least amount of buses that the optimizer may place in a domain. It is a
semi-continuous variable, because it is not allowed to have values greater than zero
or less than the minimum value entered. In other words, the domains created can
have zero elements or be greater than or equal to the minimum value entered.
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The resulting configurations show that by increasing this variable and keeping
the other variable constant will have different effects depending on the magnitude of
the value of the maximum number of trust nodes. If we observe Fig 4.1 and evaluate
the results shown from figure 1(a) through 1(c), we see that when the maximum
trust nodes value is small, the effect of the minimum number of buses variable on
the result is minimum. This is not the case on the second and third line, it modifies
on the configuration produced, the size of the domains increases as the value of this
variable increase as well.
4.6.2

Maximum number of trust nodes.

We can observe this variable’s effect

if we examine the series of figures vertically. In the first column of figures, the
minimum number of buses remained constant at two as the maximum number of
trust nodes increases the number of domains produced increased. The optimizer is
able to produce more domains with the more trust nodes it was allowed to work
with. However, as we move to the last column its effect is reduced to the point
where on the very last figure, even though it is allowed to place seven trust nodes it
only utilized two. The minimum number of buses per node did not allow for more
domains to be created.
4.6.3 Variable effect analysis.

As we have seen this variables may or may not

have an effect on the configuration produced. It will depend closely on the value of
the other variable. When both variables have a small value, the output will very
similar to the output produced when both values have large values. The output will
be bounded by the value of the number of trust nodes is small regardless of the
value of the number of nodes. On the other hand, the result is bounded by the
minimum number of trust nodes, regardless of the number of trust nodes allowed. It
is also worth mentioning, that it appears that there is a point in the experiment
where the output is similar, if we observe the top row and right column, the
configuration is almost identical. However, figures 1(b), 1(e), 1(f), and 1(f) reflect a
diversity of topologies.
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Table 4.1 shows the running times for the trials shown in Fig.4.1.
Table 4.1:

Running times for network with 14 Nodes, and 5 messages in Windows
Sub-figure Trust Min Nodes Domains Running
number
nodes
p/domain created
Time
1(a)
2
2
2
8.999
1(b)
2
4
2
0.546
1(c)
2
7
2
0.110
1(d)
4
2
3
48.061
1(e)
4
4
3
0.203
1(f)
4
7
2
0.109
1(g)
7
2
5
25.811
1(h)
7
4
3
0.172
1(i)
7
7
2
0.188

From this table, we can see that the cases 1(d) and 1(g) are the slowest running
cases. This is somewhat reasonable, since the number of trust nodes has increased,
and with a low minimum number of trust nodes is able to break down the network
into smaller domains. Therefore the number of feasible solutions increases increasing
the solution space that is being searched as well.
It is worth mentioning that similar behavior was observed in other scenarios ran
during this research. We now examine specific cases of the different topologies
examined during this research.
4.7

Scenario Runs

There were a total of nineteen different scenarios ran throughout this research.
Each scenario has a different number of nodes, edges or messages added to the file.
This included three scenarios with four nodes, five scenarios with five nodes, three
scenarios with seven nodes, three scenarios with fourteen nodes, one scenario with
twenty nodes, two scenarios with thirty nodes, and one scenario with fifty-seven
nodes. The scenarios that have the same number of nodes or edges, are different
because the nodes are connected differently or the weight of the edges is different.
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Each scenario was ran several times (see Table 4.2) using different values for the
following variables in the input file:
For brevity, only three scenarios are examined during this chapter. Table 4.2
shows the three scenarios evaluated in this chapter.
Table 4.2: Number of runs per scenario
Scenario
Number of Runs
14 Bus, 20 Branch
75
20 Bus 39 Branch
25
30 Bus 41 Branch
9

4.7.1

Fourteen Node Scenario.

This scenario was obtained from the IEEE 14

Bust Test Case, which represent a portion of the American Electric Power System,
Midwestern US; as of February, 1962.
This network scenario was run using three different input files with three, five
and ten messages (or test paths).
4.7.1.1

Three-message scenario, Linux runs.

This scenario was

run in both operating systems, Linux and Windows. Following are some of the times
obtained during the runs that were processed in Linux; these scenarios are listed in
Table 4.3:
Table 4.3:

Running times for Network with 14 Nodes, and 3 messages in Linux
Op
Trust Min Nodes Domains Running
System nodes
p/domain created
Time
Linux
2
5
2
0.108
Linux
3
7
4
0.177
Linux
5
3
4
0.295
Linux
2
3
2
1.641
Linux
7
2
5
616.000
Linux
2
2
2
10.389
Linux
5
2
4
313.000
Linux
5
4
3
0.146
Linux
3
3
2
1.058
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The fastest run was the case with two trust nodes and a minimum of five
nodes per domain. The model created two domains. We can observe the
configuration resulting from the optimization in Fig. 4.2. It is important to observe
that the optimizer placed the trust nodes at nodes where messages and any traffic
between domains can be monitored. Node five, has three branches leading to the
other domain, and node nine has two branches; there are no other branches between
domains.

Figure 4.2:
per domain

Configuration for a 14 Node network, 2 trust nodes, 5 minimum nodes

Table 4.4 shows the paths tested on this scenario and also the delay times caused
by the path only, the trust nodes that were placed along the path, and lastly the
threshold that paths was subject. The total delay on each of the paths is less than
the time threshold they were subject to.
Table 4.4:
Path 1
Path 2
Path 3

Message paths for the 14 node, 3 message fastest case in Linux
Nodes Traversed Time tN Delay Total Delay Threshold
6 13
42
0
42
2000
7 4 5 6
12
1200
1212
4000
8 7 4 5 12
90
1200
1290
4000
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The slowest run was seen in the case where there were seven trust nodes
available and a minimum of two nodes per domain allowed. For this case, the
optimization allowed five domains to be created. The optimizer utilized all seven
trust nodes, and we can observe in Fig. 4.3 that it places the trust nodes in such a
way that the communication between domains is secured. Similarly, the minimum
number of nodes per domain has been satisfied as well. The trust node requirement
is that at least one of the domains monitors the transmission of messages, so that
minimize the delay introduced by trust nodes but at the same time, each message
traveling between domains is either checked for security irregularities at the time is
leaving or arriving to the domain. The resulting configuration in Fig. 4.3 enforces
the above description.

Figure 4.3:
per domain

Configuration for a 14 Node network, 7 trust nodes, 2 minimum nodes

Table 4.5 show the values of the delays that were induced due to the path
traversal and its passing through the nodes with trust nodes. We can observe that
message number three approaches the threshold.

82

Table 4.5:
Path 1
Path 2
Path 3
4.7.1.2

Message paths for the 14 node, 3 message slowest case in Linux
Nodes Traversed Time tN Delay Total Delay Threshold
1 2 3
21
0
21
2000
6 13
21
1200
1221
4000
7 4 5 6
6
1800
1806
4000
Three-message, Windows runs.

For this scenario, the times

were very close to the results obtained with the Linux version. Table 4.6, shows
some of the times obtained.
Table 4.6:

Running times for Network with 14 Nodes, and 3 messages in Windows
Op
Trust Min Nodes Domains Running
System nodes
p/domain created
Time
Windows
2
5
2
0.094
Windows
3
7
2
0.094
Windows
5
3
2
0.930
Windows
2
3
2
1.641
Windows
7
2
5
616.000
Windows
2
2
2
10.827
Windows
5
2
4
312.000
Windows
5
4
3
0.146
Windows
3
3
3
1.656

The fastest scenario was the scenario with two trust nodes and two nodes per
domain minimum, its time was 0.094. Fig. 4.4, shows the configuration that the
optimizer produced.
This case illustrates what the optimizer opts to do when the number of resources
is small. The optimizer is allowed only 2 trust nodes, therefore looks for a better
way to satisfy the constraints of contiguous nodes in domains and also trust node
strategic placement monitor incoming and outgoing messages. In this case, trust
nodes four and five are good solutions. There can be many other solutions to this
case. The network configurations output are feasible solutions given the constraints
that the input parameters were subject to during the optimization.
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Figure 4.4:
per domain

Configuration for a 14 Node network, 2 trust nodes, 2 minimum nodes

Table 4.7 shows the delay accumulation of the three messages passed on to the
optimizer, neither of them exceeded time constraints. The longest message passes
through two trust nodes which adds 1, 200 msecs. of delay, but it is still less than
the threshold for messages transmission.
Table 4.7:
Windows
Path 1
Path 2
Path 3

Message paths traversed for the 14 Node 3 message fastest case in
Nodes Traversed
1 2 3
6 13
7 4 5 6

Time
21
21
6

tN Delay Total Delay
0
21
0
21
1200
1206

Threshold
2000
4000
4000

The case with the slowest running time evaluated was run with seven trust nodes
and a minimum of two nodes per domain. Fig.4.5 shows the network configuration
produced after the trial was run.
Table 4.8 shows the paths that were evaluated during this trial. The path with
the longest delay is path three with 1, 207 msecs. The model has arranged the
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Figure 4.5:
per domain

Configuration for a 14 Node network, 7 trust nodes, 2 minimum nodes

domains and the locations of the trust nodes considering the traffic of messages
input to the model.
Table 4.8:
Windows
Path 1
Path 2
Path 3

4.7.1.3

Message paths traversed for the 14 Node 3 message slowest case in
Nodes
1 2
2 5
8 7

Traversed
3
6 12
4 5 6

Time
21
57
7

tN Delay Total Delay
600
621
600
657
1200
1207

Five-message , Linux runs .

Threshold
2000
4000
4000

The results obtained in this

trial can be observed in Table 4.9.
The fastest run occurred when the model was allowed a maximum of six trust
nodes and the minimum number of nodes per domain was set to five. The resulting
running time was 0.15 msecs. Fig. 4.6 contains the solution provided by the
optimizer.
Table 4.10 shows the results for this run. The message paths used in this run
were entered manually. Consequently, we find some paths that are not the shortest
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Table 4.9:

Figure 4.6:
per domain

Running times for 14 node network with and 5 messages in Linux
Op
Trust Min Nodes Domains Running
System nodes
p/domain created
Time
Linux
10
2
4
23.768
Linux
7
4
3
0.150
Linux
7
3
4
0.238
Linux
7
2
4
11.227
Linux
10
2
4
23.768
Linux
4
2
3
20.408
Linux
4
3
2
4.717
Linux
7
2
5
47.940
Linux
7
3
4
0.238
Linux
7
4
3
0.150
Linux
6
5
2
0.105
Linux
6
3
4
0.310
Linux
6
4
3
0.145
Linux
6
2
5
12.605
Linux
4
2
3
139.000
Linux
5
2
2
9.860

Configuration for a 14 Node network, 7 trust nodes, 4 minimum nodes

paths. However, the results still come short from the thresholds that they were run
against. The path with the longest delay is path number two. Although the delay
caused by the traversing is only 58 msecs, the message stops at 4 trust nodes

86

causing the delay to quickly increase. To solve this, rules can carefully be defined ,
so that we do not duplicate security functions within the same domain.
Table 4.10:
Linux
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path

1
2
3
4
5

Message paths and delays for the 14 Node, 5 message fastest case in
1
11
8
14
5

Nodes Traversed
2 4 9 14 13
10 9 4 3
7 9 14 13 12
9 4 2
4 7 9 10

Time tN Delay Total Delay
118
1200
1318
58
2400
2458
164
600
764
59
600
659
16
1800
1816

Threshold
2000
4000
4000
180000
300000

The slowest run in this scenario happened when the maximum trust node
allowed variable was set to 4 and the minimum nodes per domain was set to 2. The
optimizer provided 3 domains with a large domain containing nine nodes out of the
fourteen; the other 2 domains had three and two nodes in them. The reason, for this
number was mainly because of the number of trust nodes that were available. Fig.
4.7 shows the domain configuration mentioned above.

Figure 4.7:
per domain

Configuration for a 14 Node network, 4 trust nodes, 2 minimum nodes
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In Table 4.11 the message paths used in the previous section are used with
different configuration. The optimizer outputs configurations which enforce the
times constraints or thresholds listed in the last column.
The thresholds of 180, 000 and 300, 000 msecs entered correspond to the thermal
overload and poorly damped, or un-damped oscillations time constraints from the
Backup protection and Control; WAPaC system. The threshold do not state a
specific length of time, so an estimate of 180 secs and 300 secs was entered. For
reference see table 2.3.
Table 4.11:
Linux
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path

1
2
3
4
5

Message paths traversed for the 14 Node, 5 message fastest case in
1
11
8
14
5

4.7.1.4

Nodes Traversed
2 4 9 14 13
10 9 4 3
7 9 14 13 12
9 4 2
4 7 9 10

Time tN Delay Total Delay
118
1200
1318
58
1800
2458
164
1200
764
59
600
659
16
1200
1816

Five-message, Windows runs.

Threshold
2000
4000
4000
180000
300000

Fig. 4.12 displays the results

for the 14 node case. There is no significant difference between the Windows cases.
The case with ten trust nodes and a minimum of two nodes per domains is
shown in Fig. 4.8. The model produced a total of four domains, and placed the
trust nodes in nodes five, six, seven, nine, ten, eleven, and twelve.
The model choses a solution where it has grouped a set of nodes based on the
degree of the protection that the placement of a trust node adds to the network,
without regarding proximity. For example, node nine and fourteen have a delay of
40msecs and the edge between nine and four, or seven has a delay of 1msec and still
nodes nine and fourteen have been placed together but separate from nodes four and
seven. This is because the constraints allow to place greater importance when
choosing the position of a trust node.
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Table 4.12:

Running times for scenario with 14 Nodes, 5 messages in Windows
Op
Trust Min Nodes Domains Running
System nodes
p/domain created
Time
Windows
10
2
5
10.64
Windows
7
4
3
0.187
Windows
7
3
4
0.391
Windows
7
2
5
25.186
Windows
6
5
2
0.109
Windows
6
4
3
0.344
Windows
6
3
4
0.500
Windows
6
2
5
7.672
Windows
5
2
4
135.00
Windows
4
3
3
1.328
Windows
4
2
3
48.061
Windows
3
2
3
36.545
Windows
2
2
2
8.968

Figure 4.8:
14 Node network, Maximum of 10 trust nodes, and a minimum of 2
nodes per domain
Table 4.13 shows the times resulting from this run. The message paths input,
were entered manually and do not represent the shortest path between the source
and destination node.
Next, Fig. 4.9 displays what the optimizer does as the number of trust nodes
allowed is reduced. It creates larger domains so that it compensates for the reduction
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Table 4.13:
Windows
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path

1
2
3
4
5

Message paths traversed for the 14 Node, 5 message fastest case in
1
11
8
14
5

Nodes Traversed
2 4 9 14 13
10 9 4 3
7 9 14 13 12
9 4 2
4 7 9 10

Time tN Delay Total Delay
118
600
718
58
2400
2458
164
1800
1964
59
600
659
16
2400
2416

Threshold
2000
4000
4000
180000
300000

in trust nodes. This way, the need for trust nodes is reduced because the branches
between domains are less and it can use the fewer trust nodes more effectively.

Figure 4.9:
14 Node network, Maximum of 5 trust nodes, and a minimum of 2
nodes per domain
Table 4.14 shows the paths that were tested. We can observe that path number
two gets closer to the time constraint corresponding to its type of message, however,
the output configuration kept it below the time constraint, although the optimizer
utilized all of the trust nodes, it was able to placed them such that the message
traffic input did not exceed the constraints.
The minimum running time for this scenario was 0.105msecs, while the
maximum was 139.00msecs and the average was 21.148msecs. There is no
noticeable difference between the Windows and Linux runs of this scenario.
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Table 4.14:
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path

1
2
3
4
5

1
11
8
1
6

4.7.1.5

Message paths traversed for the 14 Node 5 message case in Windows
Nodes Traversed
Time tN Delay Total Delay Threshold
2 4 9 14 13
118
1200
1318
2000
10 9 4 3
58
1200
1258
4000
7 9 14 13 12
164
1200
1364
4000
2 4 7 8
26
0
26
2000
5 4 9 10
16
1200
1216
300000
Ten message Linux runs.

The results for this case are shown

in Table 4.15. There is a climb in the running times for this scenario. The number
of messages appear to start having an effect on the complexity of the optimization.
Table 4.15:

Running times for Network with 14 Nodes, and 5 messages in Linux
Op
Trust Min Nodes Domains Running
System nodes
p/domain created
Time
Linux
10
2
6
357.000
Linux
7
4
3
0.170
Linux
7
3
4
0.188
Linux
7
2
5
3640.000
Linux
6
5
2
0.134
Linux
6
4
3
0.170
Linux
6
3
4
0.720
Linux
6
2
5
10844.000
Linux
5
2
4
16469.000
Linux
4
3
3
35.944
Linux
4
2
2
0.762
Linux
3
3
3
3.103
Linux
3
2
3
77.000
Linux
2
2
2
7.585

As we can see, if the number of trust nodes is left constant and reduce the
minimum number of nodes per domain the running times increase rapidly. However,
as the maximum number of trust nodes is reduced as well, the rate at which the
running times increases slows down.
The overall statistics show a spike in the running times. The fastest scenario ran
for 0.134 secs, and the slowest scenarios ran for 16, 469 secs. The average time was
2, 336.052 secs. This number shows that the time spread in the data points is large.
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Fig. 4.10 represents the configuration produced by the optimizer. Note that the
domain composed by nodes 1,2,3,4,5 does not contain a trust node in it.
Nonetheless, overall network security has been preserved. However, there is no
branch leaving this domain that connects to other domains where a trust node is not
present.

Figure 4.10:
per domain

Configuration for a 14 Node network, 6 trust nodes, 2 minimum nodes

Table 4.16 shows the resulting delay for all ten messages entered for this trial.
Each simulated message has been assigned a different message type from the
operating constraints defined in Chapter 2. We can see that every message has met
the time constraint that it has been subject to.
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Table 4.16:
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

4.7.1.6

Message paths traversed for the 14 Node, 10 message case in Linux
Nodes Traversed
Time tN Delay Total Delay Threshold
4 9 10
11
1200
1211
2000
1 5 4 9 14
62
600
662
4000
14 9 7
41
1200
1241
4000
2 4
18
0
18
100000
8 7 9
2
1200
1202
180000
7 4 5 6 12
44
1200
1244
300000
11 6 5 2
49
1200
1249
6000
3 4 5 6 12
64
600
664
3600000
5 6 12
39
600
639
540000
13 6 5 4 3
47
1200
1247
100000
Ten message Windows runs.

Table 4.17 shows the running

times obtained during this case.
Table 4.17:

Running times for Network with 14 Nodes, and 10 messages in Windows
Op
Trust Min Nodes Domains
Running
System nodes
p/domain created
Time
Windows
10
2
6
916.000
Windows
7
4
3
0.171
Windows
7
3
4
0.219
Windows
7
2
5
3640.000
Windows
6
5
2
0.125
Windows
6
4
3
0.375
Windows
6
3
4
0.625
Windows
6
2
5
3329.000
Windows
5
2
CRASHED
Windows
4
3
3
14.417
Windows
4
2
3
759.000
Windows
3
2
3
74.000
Windows
2
2
2
8.559

The next three figures provide an idea of how the optimizer behaves when the
values of the test variables of maximum amount of trust nodes and the minimum
number of nodes per domain are changed. The figures illustrate the evolution of
modifications performed as the parameters change. We can see starting from
Fig.11(a) how the solution evolves to Fig.11(b) and ends with Fig.11(c). As the
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number of trust nodes increases the optimizer is able to build solutions with more
domains, because it is able to protect the traffic between them as long as it does not
go below the minimum number of nodes per domain.

(a) 3 trust Nodes, 2 nodes per domain minimum (b) 4 trust nodes, 3 nodes per domain minimum

(c) 6 trust nodes, 3 nodes per domain minimum

Figure 4.11:

Configuration changes using different input values on the same scenario

Table 4.18 shows the delay resulting from running the trial shown on Fig. 11(b).
Lastly, the configuration output by the model preserves all the thresholds that have
been provided to it.
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Table 4.18:
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
4.7.2

Message paths traversed for the 14 Node, 10 message case in Windows
Nodes Traversed
Time tN Delay Total Delay Threshold
1
4 9 10
11
1200
1211
2000
2
1 5 4 9 14
62
1800
1862
4000
3
14 9 7
41
600
641
4000
4
2 4
18
600
618
100000
5
8 7 9
2
600
602
180000
6
7 4 5 6 12
44
1800
1844
300000
7
11 6 5 2
49
1200
1249
6000
8
3 4 5 6 12
64
1800
1864
3600000
9
5 6 12
39
1200
1239
540000
10 13 6 5 4 3
47
1800
1847
100000
Twenty Node Scenario .

The network represented in this scenario

does not represent an actual case of a power grid region. It is a simulated
configuration created only to provide a step before moving into a higher node
network.
The scenarios reported in this section are only two of the four different network
files tested. The first scenario has a total of ten messages, and the second scenario
has 20 messages. This scenario was ran in Linux and Windows operating systems.
Each one, was ran utilizing twelve different combinations of values for the maximum
number of trust nodes and the minimum number of nodes per domain variables.
4.7.2.1

Ten message Linux runs.

The summary of results for this

run are shown in Table 4.19.
The trial with 14 trust nodes and 2 minimum nodes per domain shows with
great detail what the optimizer does when it has many trust nodes to subdivide the
network. It shows that having a large amount of trust nodes increases the security
of the network because it allows the optimizer to create a larger number of domains
and isolates them by placing a trust node at strategic locations as shown in Fig.
4.12.
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Table 4.19:

Running times for Network with 20 Nodes, and 10 messages in Linux
Op
Trust Min Nodes Domains Running
System nodes
p/domain created
Time
Linux
14
6
3
1.141
Linux
14
4
5
2.316
Linux
14
3
6
2.776
Linux
14
2
9
3605.000
Linux
10
5
4
2.401
Linux
10
4
5
2.848
Linux
10
3
6
25.130
Linux
10
2
6
3604.000
Linux
5
6
3
0.688
Linux
5
4
3
918.000
Linux
5
3
3
3681.000
Linux
3
3
2
151.000

Figure 4.12:
20 Node network, Maximum of 14 trust nodes, and a minimum of 2
nodes per domain
In comparison with the runs from the previous section, there is no noticeable
increase of running times. The minimum time is 0.688 secs, the maximum time is
3, 681 msecs and the average is 999.6917 secs. The values presented in Table 4.20
support the time constraint premise, since none of the times violate the constraint
the bounds the time alloted to that type of message.
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Table 4.20:
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

4.7.2.2

Message paths traversed for the 20 Node, 10 message case in Linux
Nodes Traversed
Time tN Delay Total Delay Threshold
1 19
40
600
640
2000
2 4 7 9 10
186
2400
2586
4000
3 4 7 9 14
244
2400
2644
4000
17 16 6
145
1800
1945
1000000
8 18
46
600
646
6000
5 4 7 9
116
1800
1916
3600000
12 6 5 4 3
233
1800
2033
540000
10 11
62
1200
1262
3600000
14 13 6 16 17
299
3000
3299
1000000
18 13 6 5 2
201
3000
3201
300000
Ten message, Windows runs.

The summary of results for

this run are shown in Table 4.21
Table 4.21:

Running times for Network with 20 Nodes, and 10 messages in Windows
Op
Trust Min Nodes Domains
Running
System nodes
p/domain created
Time
Windows
10
2
6
916.000
Windows
7
4
3
0.171
Windows
7
3
4
0.219
Windows
7
2
5
3640.000
Windows
6
5
2
0.125
Windows
6
4
3
0.375
Windows
6
3
4
0.625
Windows
6
2
5
3329.000
Windows
5
2
CRASHED
Windows
4
3
3
14.417
Windows
4
2
3
759.000
Windows
3
2
3
74.000
Windows
2
2
2
8.559

Fig.4.13 shows the configuration produced when running the model using
variables maximum trust nodes of ten, and a minimum nodes per domain of four.
The optimizer build a total of five domains, and once again we can observe that the
trust nodes have been placed at places where they are able to monitor or oversee the
traffic leaving or arriving to that specific domain. If we notice, nodes six and eleven
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contain trust nodes and they are contiguous nodes. This situation increases the
delay of a message path, and it may be somewhat redundant. This delay could be
reduced if we could carefully implement a security system where a trust node is able
recognize that a message has been scanned by another trust nodes next to it, or in
the same domain and maybe perform basic checks for protection or simply not touch
the message.

Figure 4.13:
20 Node network, Maximum of 10 trust nodes, and a minimum of 4
nodes per domain
Table 4.22 shows the results obtained from this trial.
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Table 4.22:
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path

Message paths traversed for the 20 Node, 10 message case in Windows
Nodes Traversed
Time tN Delay Total Delay Threshold
1 19
40
600
640
2000
2 4 7 9 10
186
1800
1986
4000
3 4 7 9 14
244
1800
2044
4000
17 16 6
145
1200
1345
1000000
8 18
46
600
646
6000
5 4 7 9
116
1800
1916
3600000
12 6 5 4 3
233
1200
1433
540000
10 11
62
600
662
3600000
14 13 6 16 17
299
1800
2099
1000000
18 13 6 5 2
201
2400
2601
300000

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

4.7.2.3

Twenty message Linux runs.

Table 4.23 shows the number

of domains formed and the running times for the twenty message Linux runs. We
begin to observe a rise in the running times in comparison with previous runs. The
longest run was for 2029 secs. for the configuration that allowed five trust nodes and
a minimum of three nodes per domain. The fastest trial run was the configuration
that had a fourteen trust nodes and a minimum of six domains with a running time
of 1.173 secs. The optimizer created three domains to come out with this solution.
Table 4.23:

Running times for a 20 Node Network and
Op
Trust Min Nodes Domains
System nodes
p/domain created
Linux
14
6
3
Linux
14
6
4
Linux
14
3
5
Linux
14
2
3
Linux
10
5
4
Linux
10
4
4
Linux
10
3
5
Linux
10
2
6
Linux
5
6
3
Linux
5
4
3
Linux
5
3
3
Linux
3
3
2
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20 messages in Linux
Running
Time
1.173
15.269
58.147
21699.000
1.554
21.412
54.565
21634.000
1.861
88.000
2029.000
66.000

Table 4.24:
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

1
20
12
16
7
13
17
15
10
8
1
5
6
6
12
5
4
13
12
19

Message paths traversed for the 20 Node, 20 message case in Linux
Nodes Traversed
Time tN Delay Total Delay Threshold
2 4
76
0
76
3600000
7 8 18 13
190
1800
1990
1000000
6 5 2
220
1200
1420
6000
6 13 18 8
155
3000
3155
180000
8 18
103
1200
1303
540000
6 16
87
1800
1887
4000
15 5 4 7 20
256
600
856
2000
5 4 7 9
149
600
749
300000
9 7 4 2
186
600
786
3600000
7 4 5
138
1200
1338
180000
5 6 13 18
217
2400
2617
6000
4 7 9 14
203
1200
1403
1000000
13 18 8
110
2400
2510
300000
13 18
64
1800
1864
1000000
6 5 2
220
1200
1420
540000
4 3
69
600
669
1000000
5 6 13 18
159
2400
2559
6000
6 5 2
179
1800
1979
300000
13 18 8 7 20
254
1800
2054
3600000
1 5 6 13 18
257
3000
3257
1000000

Fig.4.14 shows the resulting configuration when the system has ten trust nodes
available to place in the network. This solution produced a total of six domains. It
seems like the answer is not the best solution possible. It contains a domain
containing eight nodes and four domains with only two nodes in them. There are
several nodes where redundant placement of trust node has occurred. A solution
with a more even number of nodes per domain seems to be more appropriate and
probably a better utilization of trust node resources to improve network security.
Table 4.24 on page 100, shows the paths entered in to this case. This paths were
created automatically using the shortest path application developed for this research.
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Figure 4.14:
20 Node network, maximum of 10 trust nodes, and a minimum of 2
nodes per domain
4.7.2.4

Twenty message Windows runs.

Table 4.25 on page

102 presents the running times obtained after running this scenario.
The Windows optimizer crashed twice in the first run. Each of the scenarios that
crashed were reran for a total of three tries. On all three runs, the memory available
counter in the IVE had about 760 MBytes left by the time the optimizer halted.
Once this happened, the XPress-MP had to be restarted as it would become
completely unstable. Therefore, no results were available for those scenarios.
Fig.4.15 on page 102, shows the configuration produced by the windows
optimizer for this case. In this case, we increased the minimum number of nodes per
domain allowed. This parameter combination seem to produced a better result as
far as the number of nodes per domain. The range in the number of nodes per
domain is smaller. The most populated domain has six nodes and the least
populated has four nodes.
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Table 4.25:

Running times for Network with 20 Nodes, and 20 messages in Windows
Op
Trust Min Nodes Domains
Running
System nodes
p/domain created
Time
Windows
14
6
3
0.547
Windows
14
6
4
6.578
Windows
14
3
5
39.343
Windows
14
2
CRASHED
Windows
10
5
4
1.218
Windows
10
4
4
4.406
Windows
10
3
5
42.342
Windows
10
2
CRASHED
Windows
5
6
3
1.172
Windows
5
4
3
53.202
Windows
5
3
3
752.000
Windows
3
3
2
74.000

Figure 4.15:
20 Node network, maximum of 10 trust nodes, and a minimum of 4
nodes per domain
Table 4.26 on page 103, shows the delay on each of the paths input to the
model, neither of the message paths violated its time constraint. We can see that
some of the thresholds are large enough to not allow this. However, we can see that
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some of the messages could have violated a 2 msec (2000) constraint if they have
had been entered with a different message type.
Table 4.26:
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

4.7.3

Message paths traversed for the 20 Node, 20 message case in Windows
Nodes Traversed
Time tN Delay Total Delay Threshold
1 2 4
76
600
676
3600000
20 7 8 18 13
190
1200
1390
1000000
12 6 5 2
220
1800
2020
6000
16 6 13 18 8
155
1200
1355
180000
7 8 18
103
600
703
540000
13 6 16
87
600
687
4000
17 15 5 4 7 20
256
600
856
2000
15 5 4 7 9
149
1200
1349
300000
10 9 7 4 2
186
1800
1986
3600000
8 7 4 5
138
1200
1338
180000
1 5 6 13 18
217
1200
1417
6000
5 4 7 9 14
203
1800
2003
1000000
6 13 18 8
110
1200
1310
300000
6 13 18
64
600
664
1000000
12 6 5 2
221
1800
2021
540000
5 4 3
69
600
669
1000000
4 5 6 13 18
159
1200
1359
6000
13 6 5 2
179
1800
1979
300000
12 13 18 8 7 20
254
1800
2054
3600000
19 1 5 6 13 18
257
1800
2057
1000000

Thirty Node Scenario .

This scenario was built using the data from

the Power Systems Test Case Archive. This section shows the different
configurations tested with ten messages as the input traffic. Additionally, the results
from the Windows and Linux trials are shown here.
4.7.3.1

Thirty message Linux runs.

This section will summarize the

results obtained from running the thirty node network varying the values for the
maximum number of trust nodes and the minimum number of nodes per domain.
Table 4.27 summarizes the running times and the number of nodes created on each
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Table 4.27:
in Linux

Running times for 30 Node network with 14 Nodes, and 10 messages
Op
System
Linux
Linux
Linux
Linux
Linux
Linux
Linux
Linux
Linux
Linux
Linux
Linux

Trust
nodes
14
10
5
14
10
5
15
15
15
12
10
6

Min Nodes
p/domain
6
6
6
4
4
4
6
4
8
8
8
8

Domains
created
5
5
3
7
6
3
5
7
3
3
3
3

Running
Time
5.8121
24.421
3612.000
11.966
3607.000
3622.000
6.383
12.402
2.405
2.952
2.699
2.995

trial. The configuration that has the shortest running time is the ninth trial in the
table, it created three domains and ran for 2.405.
The slowest trial ran for 3622 secs. This trial does present a slight increase of
running times. If we compare the fastest case from the previous Linux run
containing 10 messages (20 Node scenario); we get an increase of over 300% which is
probably our greatest increase rate. However, the longest time and the average do
not show the same increase rate.
Fig.4.16 illustrates the configuration produced when running the model with ten
trust nodes and minimum of six nodes per domain this network with a maximum of
ten trust nodes and a minimum of six nodes per domain. The number of nodes per
domain is evenly distributed among all the domains. We can observe that the trust
nodes have been placed at nodes that connect to other domains, such that no
message be able to leave or enter a domain without being monitored.
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Figure 4.16:
30 Node network, Maximum of 10 trust nodes, and a minimum of 6
nodes per domain
Finally, Table 4.28 summarizes the paths input to the model and their delays
with the configuration presented in Fig. 4.16.
Table 4.28:
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path
Path

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Message paths traversed for the 30 Node, 10 message case in Windows
Nodes Traversed
Time tN Delay Total Delay Threshold
4 6 10
5
1200
1205
2000
1 3 4 12 15
40
1200
1240
4000
30 27 28 6 7
113
1800
1913
6000
22 21 10 6 4 12 14
60
2400
2460
360000
18 15 12 4 2
74
1800
1874
4000
7 6 9
9
1800
1809
300000
6 28
7
600
607
180000
11 9 10 21
13
1200
1213
4000
12 13
1
600
601
1000000
13 12 4 6 10 17
17
2400
2417
540000
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4.8

57 Node Scenario

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the test cases examined in this
chapter were not the only ones that were explored. A larger IEEE test case was run
on four different occasions. The first two times the scenario was run, it was left to
run without a time limit. The first time it ran for approximately over (no record of
stopping time was available) three days. After the third day, the run crashed while
unattended; there was no error message or anything to provide any information
about the cause of the failure. The second time, it ran for four days also. This time,
we used a Linux application called “screen” which is used to keep applications
running under the “screen” active even in the event when the connection to the
Linux service is dropped or session log offs was used. The process ID corresponding
to the Mosel run was monitored closely to identify any circumstances that may have
lead to the first failure. The CPU was being used at 100% and the memory was
being used at 99.7% as well. Unfortunately, the application failed to keep the session
active and no record of this run was recover either.
The last two runs, were timed to run for four and six hours. However, the results
that were obtained on both cases were different from each other and also erroneous.
The domains created were not contiguous, in other words a domain contains nodes
without an edge connecting them different regions within the network but different
on both runs. This results suggest the possibility that the run had not arrived to a
feasible solutions when it is stopped and that more run time may be needed to
achieve a better solution. Appendix VI illustrates one of the configurations output
by one of the runs.
4.9

Note on Windows runs

It is important to note, that when the model was executed in Windows; it
crashed in several occasions. Even on smaller cases that lasted three or four hours in
the Linux version, the Windows based would not be able to complete the trial and
crashed. In addition to this, the optimizer would prompt the user to close the
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XPress-MP because the system was unstable, after closing the message box the
optimizer was noticeable erratic in behavior. The only way to fix this behavior was
to close the optimizer completely and restart again.
4.10

Totals

Table 4.29 shows the totals for each of the scenarios ran and final values for the
overall research runs. The scenarios that have an asterisk (*) in the average time
have trials that crashed and no running time was collected.
Table 4.29: Total Results for the over all runs shown in this document
Scenario
Op System Fastest
Slowest Avg Time
14 Node 3 Msgs
Linux
0.099
616.000
104.757
14 Node 3 Msgs
Windows
0.094 1709.000
188.111
14 Node 5 Msgs
Linux
0.105
139.000
17.878
14 Node 5 Msgs
Windows
0.109
135.000
21.149
14 Node 10 Msgs
Linux
0.134 16469.000
2415.386
14 Node 10 Msgs Windows
0.125 3640.000
*625.186
20 Node 10 Msgs
Linux
0.688 3681.000
999.691
20 Node 10 Msgs Windows
1.36 1497.000
175.177
20 Node 20 Msgs
Linux
0.956 21634.000
2179.161
20 Node 20 Msgs Windows
0.547
752.000
*97.481
30 Node 10 Msgs
Linux
2.405 3622.000
909.420
30 Node 10 Msgs Windows
1.453
116.000
*21.545

4.11

Reduced Response Times or Thresholds

As an exploration for this research, different scenarios were run utilizing an
alternate threshold file containing reduced thresholds to observe how the optimizer
changed the output as some of the messages actually exceeded the modified
threshold.
It was observed that when the input contains messages (or traffic) that exceeds
its threshold, the optimizer generates a different configuration that complies with
the traffic needs. In doing so, the model ensures that the traffic patterns entered the
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removes trust nodes from the configuration in order to reduce the delay introduced
by the trust node throughout the message’s path.
To better illustrate this claim, the Fig. 4.17 shows the change caused by the
reduction in response time threshold. The input parameters were exactly the same.

(a) Original response threshold times

Figure 4.17:

(b) Reduced response threshold times

Configurations results using 2 different response time values

The domains formed are different, and therefore the locations of the trust nodes
is different as well. Table 4.30 shows the original results.
Table 4.30:
Windows
Path 1
Path 2
Path 3

Message paths traversed for the 14 Node 3 message slowest case in
Nodes
1 2
2 5
8 7

Traversed
4
6
4 5 6

Time
24
57
7

tN Delay Total Delay
600
624
1200
1257
1800
1807

Threshold
2000
4000
4000

Table 4.31 shows the resulting delay and the thresholds that those paths were
compared to.
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Table 4.31:
Windows
Path 1
Path 2
Path 3
4.12

Message paths traversed for the 14 Node 3 message slowest case in
Nodes
1 2
2 5
8 7

Traversed
4
6
4 5 6

Time tN Delay Total Delay
24
0
24
57
600
657
7
1200
1207

Threshold
600
1200
1800

Windows VS Linux

As stated before, this research was done utilizing two versions of the XPress-MP
optimizer; a Linux version and a Windows version. For unknown reasons, when
running exactly the same scenario separately on each operating system; the result
obtained was different. We speculate that this is a difference in random number
seeds, which resulted in different search patterns of the solution space. An example
of this discrepancy is shown in Fig.4.18. As we can see in this figure, the
configuration resulting from each of the operating systems is completely different.
The domains formed are different, the trust nodes are placed in different nodes, too.
However, both of the solutions comply with the optimization constraints. This
difference of results was not always the case, but it often presented itself throughout
the research. Since the results were verified to be feasible answers, these differences
were assumed to be correct.

(a) Windows Run

Figure 4.18:

(b) Linux Run

Fourteen Node scenario results from Windows and Linux
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4.13

Summary

The trials described in this chapter give a clear view of what this optimization
model does. The model produces reliable configurations regardless of platform
utilized. In each trial shown the model partitioned the network into domains and
placed trust nodes at locations where it was able to protect the integrity of all
communications between domains. But most importantly, the model is able to
produced an output with the above characteristics while respecting the constraints
of response time and domain contiguity. In this chapter, we saw that the model
produces different configurations based on the number of trust nodes available and
the minimum number of nodes per domain. When the model was alloted a large
number of trust nodes in comparison with the total nodes in the network, the model
would produce as many domains as possible, which is what our objective function is.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1

Chapter Overview

T

his chapter gives a research overview, summarizes research findings,
establishes the significance and impact of this research, provides conclusions,

and the potential impact that the results of this thesis might have for future work.
Additionally, and finally it makes recommendations for follow-on work in this area.
5.2

Research Overview

Most of our critical infrastructure and especially our electric utility industry
operates under tight conditions. The demand for services has grown while the
transmission system’s capacity has experienced slower growth. This has caused the
system to become more unstable and has increased the risk of failure. The SCADA
system that monitors this delicate balance is modernizing and taking in new
technologies that bring in newer capabilities but at the same time, new
vulnerabilities. Consequently, security becomes paramount in an environment where
our critical infrastructure are a target of attacks that could weaken our economy.
Therefore, there is a strong need to protect our essential infrastructure with the
utilization of new technologies. A careful design of the network topology and the
implementation of a network security-based trust system added to the SCADA
provide an extra layer of protection against large attacks that may render our
society vulnerable. The challenge is to do so in a way or ways that will not disrupt
the time-critical protection and control systems in a SCADA system The research in
this article addresses this challenge through a trust system placement algorithm.
5.3

Summary of Research Findings

This research thesis explored the use of a new software program created
specifically for this research. This software utilizes linear programming techniques to
demonstrate that the fielding of the trust system along with the
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compartmentalization of a SCADA or power grid network is possible, and more
importantly; it is safe.
This research showed that the software, was accurate in producing feasible
solutions within a reasonable length of time, usually seconds or maybe a few hours.
Although, we can see that as the size of the network increased, the running times
increased as well. However, the larger running time increase was mainly due to the
values entered in the maximum number of trust nodes and the minimum number
nodes per domain; as these determine the size the solution space that the optimizer
will have to search. However, these times could considerably be reduced if the
optimizer was to be processed in higher end computer architectures.
The software developed was shown to perform efficiently and accurately under
different variations of the input scenario. The software was run against a total of
220 runs, each run represented a different network with either a different number of
buses (nodes) or the nodes connected by a different set of edges (branches). We also
varied the number of trust nodes that were available, the minimum number of nodes
that could be assigned to a domain. Moreover, we modified the number of messages
and their paths, to check for response time and check if they were violated when the
configuration was produced.
Furthermore, we took a configuration produced by a prior trial, used the path
delay in the output to create a threshold file with reduced values, such that those
paths were violating these thresholds from the beginning. And we ran this scenario
against the modified time threshold, and compared the results. We found that the
optimizer produced a different network configuration that enforced the new time
constraints. What this means is that the optimizer formed different domains and
moved the location where trust nodes where assigned in order to meet the new
constraints.
These findings are crucial, because they demonstrate that the proposed approach
to the implementation of the trust system is not only possible, but safe.
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5.4

Conclusion

This research demonstrated that the trust system proposed can be implemented
in a real life network by adding trust nodes to strategic nodes and combining it with
a methodical compartmentalization of the SCADA network that increase security of
the network. It indicated that we can obtained the benefits that the trust system
provides and the security enhancements that come with it by effectively determining
where this trust nodes should be placed in the network.
While the application of this proposed approach was focused on the electric
power grid. It can easily be applied to other industries in the critical infrastructure.
And also, they can be implemented in environments where requirements are not as
strict with similar results as well.
Finally, the proposed approach to trust system implementation appears to hold
great promise to facilitate greater interconnected communication in the electric
power grid. Additionally, this approach seeks to provide increased safety that can
result through secure message sharing, facilitated by the trust system and domain
grouping. This system is a step towards a comprehensive security architecture for
the power grid.
5.5

Significance of Research

The sector of our economy that this research targets is an extremely critical one.
It is one where although new communication paradigms and technologies are being
introduced without a thorough understanding of the consequences. Nonetheless, the
security issues are not being explored and solutions or alternatives are still in their
early stages. We have to remember as a nation that we are under a new type of
conflict and that our enemies are not government, or armies. We face a new type of
warfare that is not directed to our military defenses but to our society, to our
economy; and we need to protect these to the utmost. We cannot afford to ignore
security as a discipline and daily practice. This research is of great importance
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because it constitutes a move forward toward a secure and protected infrastructure,
so critical to our country.
This research brings together previous thesis efforts that proposed security
alternatives to improve the protection of the facility. This thesis implemented those
ideas and tested them against data that represents real world systems. The fact that
those ideas can be fielded and add critical security functions such as firewall, internal
traffic protection, trust level implementation, message encryption/decryption, and
other functions; without risking the safety of the facility is a step forward toward a
more secure operation at a time where is urgently needed to better protect our
critical infrastructure. Furthermore, these encouraging results represent are valuable
because this approach can be fielded without requiring interruption or shut down of
the system. It can be implemented almost transparent to operations.
5.6

Recommendations for future work

Although the results were very promising, there is further work to be done to
make it a more solid alternative. One is that the optimization model processed
could be processed utilizing a parallel processing and process more complex data
sets, as the 57 nodes was not run in its entirety since both operating systems
dumped the process when the operating system resources became scarce. Also, there
is the option of upgrading the random access memory installed in the Linux
computer, since it is a 64 bit architecture. This could potentially allow completing
processing the larger runs.
Additionally, the model could be modified and implemented as a quadratic
programming model. This may be useful as some of the constraints such as
restricting the range of nodes added to a domain so that the the domain node count
is close and the creation of large domains and very small domains is not allowed.
Also, the configurations that resulted from the experimentation in this research
may be tested in network simulators. Network simulators could be used to validate
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and support the results obtained by this research, by emulating and graphically
displaying the behavior of the network with a load of messages.
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VI. Appendix 1

T

he figure shown in this section, presents the configuration produced after
six hours of processing a 57 node network. This configuration was initially ran

without a time limitation. However, the process was halted after three days and no
output collected. The figure present several domains that have been formed but
most of them violate the constraint of domain contiguity we can see portions of one
domain in different parts of the network. This situation might have occurred
because the optimizer was not allowed to finish running, but instead forced its
termination by placing a time limit. Next page, will show its output.

Blank space left intentionally
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Figure A.1:

30 Node network, Maximum of 10 trust nodes, and a minimum of 6 nodes per domain
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